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ABSTRACT 
Identifying the Bases for Gender Differences in Guilt and Shame 
by 
R. Shawn Edmondson, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 2002 
Major Professor : Dr. Tamara J. Ferguson 
Department: Psychology 
Ill 
Gender differences are frequently revealed on the popular TOSCA-2 measure 
of guilt- and shame-proneness. These gender differences could reflect biases in the 
el iciting conditions that participants evaluate and confounds between them . A new 
instrument , the Gender Relevant Test of Self-Conscious Affect (GR-TOSCA), was 
developed to eliminate these confounds, thereby introducing a gender-sensitive, and 
therefore more valid, measure of guilt and shame proneness. The psychometric 
integrity of the new instrument , hypotheses regarding condition-specific gender 
differences in the two emotions, and relationships of guilt- and shame-proneness 
scores to gender role endorsement were examined in a sample of undergraduate 
students (93 men and 109 women). Encouraging evidence was produced for the 
reliability and validity of the GR-TOSCA , but the hypothesized gender differences in 
guilt and shame proneness were not found. Several possibilities for these results are 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Guilt and shame have long been subjects of the work of poets and bards , but 
empirical investigation of these emotions has flourished only in recent decades. These 
emotions have been conceptualized as distinct clusters of behaviors , feelings, and 
cognitions that serve important intrapersonal and interpersonal regulatory function s. 
They are intertwined with social life as they depend on socialization for their 
development , require a (real or imagined) social context to be experienced, and inevitably 
communicate appreciations of self and others (Fischer & Tangney, 1995). Shame is a 
negative evaluation of one 's entire self and originates from an individual 's perceptions 
that he or she possesses an "unwanted identity. " Guilt, on the other hand , is a reaction to 
a specific event, failure, or misdeed , reflecting a person 's perception that a person or an 
entity has been disadvantaged in some way as a result (Ferguson & Eyre, 2000; Lewis, 
1971; Olthof, 1996). These emotions also are observed as action tendencie s that serve 
functional purposes such as communicating information about the status of one's social 
relations (Barrett , 1995; Gilbert & Andrews , 1998). 
Although much of the research involving guilt and shame has focused on these 
emotions' relationship to psychopathology and well-being (e.g., Goldberg , 1991; Kohut , 
1971; Lansky , 1987; Morrison , 1989; Morrison , 1987; Nathanson , 1987), gender 
differences in guilt and shame have become a growing area of interest. 1 
I Throughout the thesis , and in agreement with terminological distinctions drawn in the social sciences 
literature, the term "gender" is used to refer to a person's self-identified role as a man or woman. 
2 
Social scientists have theoriz ed that women are more likely to experience and report guilt 
and shame than men (Brody , 1996; Lewis, 1992; Reimer , 1997; Tangney , 1994). 
Numerous scientists maintain that the gender difference in shame occurs becau se women 
are socially and economically repressed in Western society (e.g., Brody & Hall , 1993; 
Fischer , 1993; Fischer & Jansz , 1995; Harris & Schwab , 1990; Hochschild , 1983; Lutz , 
1990). It has been argued that this social and economic repression causes women to 
experience a greater number of (or more serious) "unwanted identities, " which are the 
primary feelings that underlie shame (Ferguson , Stegge , Miller , & Olsen , 1999). 
Therefore , women have many more opportunities to experience shame than men . In 
terms of the anticipated gender difference in guilt , social scientists have often noted that 
women are stereotyped as interpersonally sensitive , nurturing caregivers (Hill & Lynch , 
1983; Williams & Best, 1990). A different expectation exists for men , who are 
stereotyped as dominant , competitive , and assertive (Anti ll, 1987; Blank , 1993; Block , 
1983; Hoffman , 1975; Williams & Best, 1990). If this is true , then women shouid find it 
more difficult than men to avoid feeling as though they have disadvantaged other s, which 
some assert is the primary basis for feelings of guilt (Ferguson & Eyre, 2000 ; Olthof , 
1996). 
Empirical investigation of these hypothesized gender differences in guilt and 
shame has produced contradictory findings. Research using what is known as the 
"scenario-based assessment paradigm " has , in fact, often found this predicted gender 
difference in guilt and shame proneness. Two commonly used assessments of this type 
are the Test of Self-Conscious Affect (TOSCA; Tangney, Wagner , & Gramzow , 1992) 
3 
and its successor the TOSCA-2 (Tangney, Ferguson, Wagner, Crowley, & Gramzow, 
l 996a), which present short, hypothetical scenarios that participants imagine have 
happened to them. Participants are asked to rate how likely it is that they would exhibit a 
guilt or shame-keyed response. Their total scores on these responses are used as a 
measure of their disposition to experience guilt and shame, otherwise known as guilt and 
shame proneness. 
Assessments of guilt and shame that do not rely on scenarios, such as the Personal 
Feeling Questionnaire 2 (PFQ-2; Harder & Zalma , 1990) yield different findings. The 
PFQ-2 presents respondents with a list of shame- and guilt-related affective descriptors 
( e.g. , for guilt, "regret " and "remorse"), which participants rate in terms of how 
continuously they experience each. Frequently, on this type of measure , the predicted 
tendencies for women to report greater guilt and shame than men are not found (Ferguson 
& Eyre, 2000; Ferguson, et al., 1999; Harder , 1990; Sorensen, Ferguson , & Eyre, 1997) . 
In fact, sometimes scores on the PFQ-2 reveal the opposite trends , with greater guilt and 
especially shame proneness being revealed in men. 
Why are there inconsistencies in the nature of the gender differences found in 
guilt or shame proneness across various assessment devices ? One explanation focuses on 
the lack of gender bias apparent in certain assessments (such as the PFQ-2) in contrast to 
the potentially gender-biased nature of the situations used in scenario-based assessments 
(such as the TOSCA-2) . Ferguson, Eyre, and Ashbaker (2000) argue that gender 
differences are not usually found on non scenario-based measures like the PFQ-2 because 
these measures ask the participant to recall from their own life history situations in which 
4 
they experienced the emotions. Men and women are likely to differentially recall the 
types of situations from their personal histories that represent gender-specific threats to 
their identities. In contrast, Ferguson and her colleagues argue that women score as more 
shame-prone on the TOSCA-2 because the scenarios presented are inherently more 
threatening to the identities of women. The situations are more threatening to women 's 
identities because the TOSCA-2 consists mainly of situations that relatively seriously 
disadvantage others. Disadvantaging others is an unwanted identity for women and is 
contrary to society's expectations of appropriate behavior for women. It is these 
perceptions of possessing an unwanted identity and disadvantaging others that could 
contribute to their greater tendencies to express guilt and shame on the TOSCA-2. The 
greater guilt and shame proneness scores of women on the TOSCA-2 could therefore 
simply be an artifact created by the gender-biased nature of the scenarios presented . 
Based on the present state of the empirical literature , it is difficult to discern 
whether gender differences in guilt and shame are simply anifacts of a particular 
assessment paradigm or represent genuine gender differences in the two emotion 
dispositions. The difficulty arises because most of the situations in the TOSCA-2 
represent a confound between disadvantaging others (the guilt-inducing condition) and 
unwanted identities (the shame-inducing condition for women). One way to ascertain 
whether gender differences in either emotion are real or an artifact is to develop a new 
measure of guilt and shame proneness. Because the scenario-based TOSCA paradigm is 
thought to be the best available method to measure guilt and shame proneness (cf. 
Tangney , 1995) , this new measure would best be modeled after its most recent iteration, 
5 
the TOSCA-2. Unlike the TOSCA-2, however , the new measure would include scenarios 
that do not confound the condition of disadvantaging others with the condition of 
presenting additional unwanted identities . 
The research proposed in this thesis has three primary goals: (a) to develop a new 
scenario-based measure of guilt and shame proneness that adequately represents domains 
of unwanted identities relevant to men and women, (b) to develop a new scenario-based 
measure of guilt and shame that does not consistently confound the guilt-eliciting 
(disadvantaging others) with the shame-eliciting (unwanted identities) condition, and (c) 
to provide evidence for the validity of the interpretations made using this measure. Us ing 
this new measure , the proposed research will then test several predictions regarding 
gender differences in guilt and shame proneness. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
6 
The review of the literature is organized into several sections. Readers unfamiliar 
with the literature on guilt and shame often express two questions. Invariably , the first 
question posed is "Is there really a difference between these two emotions?" 
Conceptualizations of differences between guilt and shame are reviewed in the first 
section of this chapter. The second question consistently asked is "W hy is it important to 
differentiate between the two emotions?" which is the focus of the second section. The 
third section of the literature review will briefly outline the theoretical literature in which 
it is often argued that women are more likely to experience guilt and shame because of 
the different socialization histories and gender stereotypes prevalent in modern Western 
society . This is followed in the fourth section by a summary of studies that have 
empirica lly investigated gender differences in the two emotions . 
Conceptualizations of Differences Between 
Guilt and Shame 
Guilt and shame have appeared in scientific literature at least as far back as 
Charles Darwin's The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals in 1896 . These 
emotions were also prominent in Sigmund Freud's work, in which he emphasized guilt's 
connection to psychopathology and shame as a reaction formation against sexual 
impulses (1905/1953). But Darwin and Freud, as well as most early writers on the 
subject, failed to consistently and adequately distinguish between the two emotions. 
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Prior to the influential writings of Helen Block Lewis in 1971, the words guilt and shame 
were commonly used interchangeably by clinicians and researchers alike (two exceptions 
include Lynd, 1958 and Piers & Singer , 1953). During the past three decades , social 
scientists have reached a consensus that the two emotions are similar on several 
dimensions . For example , guilt and shame are both socially constructed emotions 
(Barrett , 1995; Baumeister , Stillwell , & Heatherton , 1995) and involve negative 
appreciations of the self or the self in relationship to others. But more recently , social 
scientists have argued that there is good reason to differentiate between the two emotions 
(Lewis , 1971, 1987; Tangney , Wagner , & Gramzow, 1992) . 
In her seminal writings , H. B. Lewis ( 1971) focused on the role of the self in 
differentiating guilt from shame. She described shame as a negative evaluation of one ' s 
entire self. Recent theories of shame incorporate this global evaluative aspect of shame 
as well (Barrett & Campos , 1987; Lewis , Sullivan , Stanger , & Weiss , 1989 ; Nathan son, 
1987; Tangne y, 1990). Other theorists have expanded upon this idea by suggesting that 
the basis of the emotion is an individual ' s perception that he or she possesses , or could be 
perceived to possess , an "unwanted identity " (Ferguson & Eyre , 2000 ; Olthof , 1996) . 
From these perspectives , any action -- real or contemplated -- can promote a shame 
response as long as the person appraises the action as reflecting negatively on his or her 
character. Thus , shame can be associated with moral transgressions or defeats , but is not 
restricted to these behaviors and need not involve causing or contemplating causing harm 
to anyone. Shame appears to often occur because one ' s actions have revealed some 
dreaded flaw in the self (be it in the realm of size and strength, dexterity and physical 
8 
skill, dependence versus independence, cognitive ability , communication , sense of self , 
gender identity and sexuality, or interpersonal skills , (cf. Nathanson , 1987). These 
revelations of one ' s dreaded self involve feelings of passivity , of being scrutinized , being 
"small ," and a general sense of helplessness (Barrett & Campos, 1987; Lewis 1971, 1987; 
Lewis , 1992; Nathanson, 1987). Presumably because of the socially evaluative nature of 
shame, its action tendencies include the desire to hide or escape, lowering of the head , 
covering the face or eyes, and other behavior s that represent attempts to minimize real or 
imagined social judgment. 
Whereas H. B. Lewis conceptualized shame as focusing on the inadequacies of 
the global self and unwanted identities, she (and others since) viewed guilt as a reaction 
to a specific event , failure , or misdeed (Barrett & Campos , 1987; Lewis , 1971; Lewis et 
al. , 1989; Nathanson , 1987; Tangney , 1990). Guilt has been more specifically defined as 
the emotion arising from the perception that the self or another person or entity has been 
disadvantaged in some way (Ferguson & Eyre , 2000 ; Olthof , 1996). These 
conceptualizations of guilt emphasize that the emotion leaves the sense of self-worth and 
competence intact. Moreover , whereas shame is usually associated with inaction and 
passivity , guilty individuals often feel compelled to make reparative action to correct or 
repair the damage they have done or imagine themselves as having done . Although 
guilty feelings prototypically arise from immoral or unethical deeds, they can also result 
from behaviors or events that are perceived to cause harm even though the harm was not 
necessarily intended nor even a part of the guilty person's goal structure (e.g. , receiving a 
bonus at work when one's coworkers do not; doing better than one's friend on an 
important exam). Guilt , therefore , involves the appraisal that one has failed to undertake 
some action or actually undertook an action that somehow was associated with 
disadvantaging another or even oneself. 
Importance of Differentiating Between 
Guilt and Shame 
The primary reason that psychologists believe it important to differentiate 
between guilt and shame is that the two emotions may play distinct roles in the 
development of pathognomic symptoms. The exact nature of either emotions' role in 
psychopathology is still unclear and many controversies abound in this literature. For 
example, although theorists such as Freud (1905/1953, 1917/ 1957, 1924/1961) heavily 
emphasized guilt's association with psychopathology , critics have argued these 
conclusions are based on an inconsistent (or nonexistent) distinction between guilt and 
shame (Tangney, 1995). In fact, guilt and shame have been shown to be differentially 
related to indices of (mal)adjustment when measured using one very popular instrument -
- the TOSCA (Tangney, Wagner , Gromzow , 1992) or its successor, the TOSCA-2 
(Tangney, Wagner , Hill-Barlow , Marschall , Gramzow, 1996). For example, using the 
TOSCA-2, Tangney and her colleagues have shown that shame proneness is predictive of 
depression and other psychological symptoms of maladjustment ( e.g. , Burggraf & 
Tangney , 1990; Gramzow & Tangney, 1992; Tangney , Wagner, Burggraf , Gran1Zow, & 
Fletcher, 1991; Tangney et al., 1992). Shame has been shown to be a central component 
of depression , narcissism , bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia (Goldberg , 1991; Kohut , 
9 
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1971; Lansky, 1987; Morrison, 1989; Morrison, 1987; Nathanson , 1987). However , guilt 
proneness -- at least as operationalized by measures like the TOSCAs -- is not strongly 
related to the same indices, especially when these scores are residualized for their 
association with shame proneness. The fact that shame and guilt are differentially 
predictive of psychological maladjustment emphasizes the importance of validly 
distinguishing between the two emotions . 
Theorized Gender Differences in 
Guilt and Shame 
It has been argued that socialization and gender roles in modern Western society 
should result in gender differences in guilt and shame proneness (e.g., Fabes & Martin , 
1991 ). These stereotypes indicate that women are expected to be loving , caring 
individuals , interpersonally sensitive and connected to others (Williams & Best , 1990). 
Such expectations could make women particularly vulnerable to seeing themselve s as 
disadvantaging others and it is these perceptions of disadvantaging that can underlie 
feelings of guilt. Women and young girls are also rejected by their peers for being 
aggressive (Crick, Casas, & Mosher, 1997), and mothers actively encourage boys more 
than girls to retaliate aggressively when provoked by angry peers (Brody , 1996; Greif , 
Alvarez, & Ulman, 1981; Zahn-Waxler , 1995). These assertions suggest that females 
across the lifespan are more likely to feel guilt because many are encouraged to assume 
care-taking roles, with aggression towards others or harming or disadvantaging others 
being clear violations of these roles. 
11 
Males, in contrast, are less likely to feel guilty than women because it is relatively 
more socially acceptable for them to disadvantage others. There is a substantial amount 
of literature that suggests men and boys are socialized and expected to be aggressive, 
achievement oriented, autonomous, and active (e.g., Antill, 1987; Blank , 1993; Block , 
1983; Hoffman , 1975; Williams & Best, 1990). Therefore it is argued that , by 
encouraging aggression and competition, these gender-role expectations serve to reduce 
many men ' s or young boys' tendencies to either express or experience guilt. 
Disadvantaging others is not only appropriate for males but is often expected of them. 
Women ' s roles and social status in Western society are also often associated with 
lower social and economic status (Brody & Hall , 1993; Fisher, 1993; Fischer & Janz , 
1995; Harris & Schwab , 1990; Manstead & Fischer , 1996; Stapley & Haviland , 1989). 
Many theorists argue that these social factors cause women to rely more heavily on others 
for their self-definition , to be more passive , and to experience feelings of helplessness , all 
of which are compatible with expectations that women would be more shame-prone than 
men. The influence of differential socialization of men and women on shame-related 
attributions about the self is made clear by Michael Lewis ( 1992). M. Lewis reviews 
evidence suggesting that girls , from an early age onwards , are socialized by parents and 
teachers to attribute their failures to internal causes and to attribute their successes to 
external causes; the opposite is true for boys . These socialized attributional styles , in 
turn, accumulate in the tendency for adult women to report, or young girls to express in 
their behavior , responses consistent with feelings of shame. In sum , women and girls are 
more likely to feel shame than men because of their relatively subservient social and 
economic status, in which they are more dependent on others for definitions of self-
worth. 
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According to these arguments, males are also less likely to possess unwanted 
identities (the shame-inducing factor) due to the greater power and status afforded them 
by society and their socialization. Because males are not socialized to make global 
attributions for their failure and are allowed to be autonomous agents pursuing their own 
goals, they are less likely to feel shame than females (Ferguson & Eyre , 2000 ; Lewis, 
1992). 
These theorized gender differences in shame proneness are important because 
they may help to explain reports in the psychological literature that twice as many women 
are depressed as men (cf. Culbertson , 1997). Many different plausible explanations have 
been offered for these findings , yet none of them has adequately explained them ( e.g., 
Nolen-Hoeksema , 1987). As mentioned above , shame proneness has been shown to be 
predictive of depression whereas guilt proneness has not. Given the relationship of these 
emotions to psychological health and the disproportionate number of women suffering 
from depression , it is important that psychologists be able to accurately assess and 
distinguish between a person ' s guilt and shame proneness. 
Empirical Evidence for Gender Differences in 
Guilt and Shame 
Research concerning gender differences in guilt and shame has produced 
contradictory findings. Social scientists have often argued and produced evidence that 
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women are more likely to experience and report more guilt and shame than men. For 
example, Michael Lewis (1992) found that " ... data from a variety of sources , including 
Carol Dweck's work on sex differences in achievement and Aaron Beck's work on 
depression, suggest that females are more likely to make global attributions of failure 
than males" (p. 73). Similarly , extending Michael Lewis's contention that females are 
more shame prone than males, Reimer (1997) stated, "The empirical evidence regarding 
gender differences ... suggests quite strongly that across the lifespan females are both more 
shame-prone and more guilt-prone than their male counterparts " (p. 46, italics in 
original). 
Ferguson and Eyre (2000) recently reviewed the empirical evidence regarding 
actual gender differences in guilt and shame proneness. They expected to find these 
predicted gender differences acros s most studies . What they discovered was that most of 
the studies that find gender differences relied on scenario-based assessments of the 
emotions . Such instruments include the Self-Conscious Affect and Attribution Inventory 
(SCAAI ; Tangney , 1990) and versions of the TOSCA-2 (Tangney et al. , 1996a) . Yet 
studies using other methods to assess guilt and shame proneness (e.g ., Brody , 1996, 1997; 
Cook , 1996; Ferguson et al. , 1999; Harder , 1990, 1995; Harder , Cutler , & Rochart , 1992; 
Izard , 1977; Mills , Pederson , & Grusec , 1989; Sorensen et al. , 1997) often did not find 
the predicted gender differences and sometimes even found that women report guilt and 
shame less frequently than men (Harder , 1995). 
One of the most widely used scenario-based assessments of gui lt and shame 
proneness is the TOSCA-2 (Tangney, Wagner, Gramzow , 1992). The TOSCA-2 presents 
14 
16 hypothetical scenarios that participants imagine have happened to them. In each of 
these situations the participant is described as engaging in behaviors that are often 
relationally assertive or aggressive and interpersonally hurtful to others. For example, 
one situation reads , "You make a mistake at work and find out a co-worker is blamed for 
the error." Participants are then asked to rate how likely it is, using a 5-point Likert scale, 
they would, among other responses ," ... keep quiet and avoid the co-worker" (this 
particular response is an indicator of shame proneness ). 
A commonly used measure that does not rely on scenarios is the PFQ-2 (Harder, 
Rockart , & Cutler, 1993). In the PFQ-2 , respondents are presented with a list of shame-
and guilt-related affective descriptors (e.g., for guilt , "regre t" and "remorse ") . which they 
then rate in terms of generally how often they experience such feelings. Responses are 
given on a scale of (0), for never having experienced the feeling, to ( 4 ), having 
experienced the feeiing continuously or almost continuously. 
Why would measures such as the PFQ-2 not reveal the gender differences in guilt 
and shame found with the TOSCA-2 ? The PFQ-2 measures the frequency or chronicity 
of a person ' s emotional experiences. It , therefore , allows men and women to 
differentially call on the types of situations from their personal histories that represent 
gender-specific threats. The TOSCA-2 , in contrast , presents scenarios in which the 
person usually brings some kind of disadvantage to another. Because the TOSCA-2 
involves these kinds of situations, and because disadvantaging others presumably is a 
greater unwanted identity for women, women may score higher than men on shame in 
response to them . Moreover, the literature on gender roles and stereotypes suggests that 
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assertive , aggressive, and competitive interpersonal behaviors that disadvantage others 
are seen as more appropriate and acceptable for men than for women , thereby 
contributing to women ' s greater guilt proneness. The design of the scenarios in the 
TOSCA-2 therefore creates a confound. In order to elicit guilt , the authors introduced 
scenarios that cause disadvantage for others , apparently without being aware that in doing 
this they were biasing the instrument in favor of finding greater expressions of guilt in 
women. Moreover, because causing disadvantage is an especially relevant unwanted 
identity for women, the measure additionally inadvertently elicits greater shame in them . 
Ferguson et al. (2000) took one of the first steps in testing this hypothesis by 
creating scenarios that were intended to be more threatening to the identities of men than 
those of women. They administered these new situations as well as situations from the 
TOSCA- 2 (Tangney et al., l 996a) to a group of 48 men and 84 women undergraduate 
students. The new situations were based on a pilot study in which men and women 
generated situation descriptions they perceived as being threatening to men 's identities 
(Alberico et al., 1998). The authors demonstrated that most of their new situations (e.g., 
not being able to change a flat tire, crying during an emotional television commercial) 
were clearly more threatening to the identities of men than women. In contrast, the 
original scenarios in the TOSCA-2 were shown to be more threatening to the identities of 
women than men. Importantly , they found the traditional gender difference in shame on 
the original TOSCA-2 scenarios (i.e., women scored as more shame prone than men) . 
Yet, in the new scenarios, men scored as more shame-prone than women . They were 
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able to show that the gender differences in shame were due to gender differences in how 
threatening each set of scenarios was to men compared to women. 
Ferguson and her colleagues also found gender differences in guilt on both the 
new scenarios and the TOSCA-2 scenarios, with men scoring as more guilt prone in the 
new situations and women scoring as more guilt prone in the TOSCA-2 situations. 
Finding that women scored higher in guilt than men on the original TOSCA-2 scenarios 
was expected , because many of the TOSCA-2 situations disadvantage others in some 
way. In fact , gender differences in perceptions that they had disadvantaged others is what 
accounted for the corresponding gender differences in guilt in these situations . However , 
finding a gender difference in guilt in the new situations was unexpected , because they 
had demonstrated that these scenarios brought little disadvantage to others. Impo11antly, 
Ferguson and her coauthors report that this gender difference in guilt in response to their 
new scenarios was reduced to almost zero when they covaried out guilt's close 
association with respondents ' ratings of shame. The authors argued that the gender 
difference found for the new "male unwanted identity" situations reflected primarily the 
greater threats of the new situations to men ' s identities. The corresponding difference in 
guilt appears to be due to the fact that guilt and shame are both negative affects that are 
moderately correlated. Intercorrelations of guilt and shame proneness, as measured by 
the TOSCA-2 , typically range from .43 to .48 (Tangney, 1990; Tangney et al. , 1993). 
In all, Ferguson and her colleagues' line of argument and data supported the 
hypothesis that women will manifest stronger shame responses than men only when the 
situation at hand is also more threatening to women's identities. One reason that past 
research has shown that women are more shame-prone than men is because it has used 
the TOSCA-2, in which the situations represent greater threats to women's than men's 
identities. 
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Despite its contribution, there are limitations to the Ferguson et al. study that this 
thesis attempts to redress. One limitation is that they used a small number of new 
situations to threaten male identities. A second problem is that they relied exclusively on 
the original TOSCA-2 scenarios to represent situations that would threaten female 
identities. The problem in relying on the TOSCA-2 to threaten female identities is that 
most of the TOSCA-2 situations also bring disadvantage to another. Thus, we do not 
know whether the tendency for women to more strongly endorse shame than men occurs 
only when another has been disadvantaged, and is thereby confounded by the guilt-
eliciting condition , or whether this gender difference in shame would also result in 
situations involving no disadvantage whatsoever. This last limitation raises an interesting 
question: are there situations involving greater unwanted identities for women that do not 
involve hurting another? 
Based on research findings obtained outside of the area of self-conscious emotion , 
specifically, Eisler and his colleagues ' work concerning stress and gender , it is proposed 
that this question can be answered in the affirmative. Eisler and Skidmore ( 1987) and 
Gillespie and Eisler ( 1992) have demonstrated there are situations that are differentially 
"stressful" to men and women. Although the concept of stress is a broad one , some of 
the situations they identified seem to be differentially stressful precisely because they 
represent gender-specific unwanted identities that are very similar to those thought to 
elicit shame in women and men . 
Using the Feminine Gender Role Stress (FORS) and the Masculine Gender Role 
Stress (MGRS) scales, Eisler and his colleagues identified five homogeneous categories 
of female gender role stressors and five homogeneous categories of male gender role 
stressors. Table 1 outlines the female gender role versus male gender role stressors that 
were empirically validated in Eisler and his colleagues' research. 
For example, items on the MGRS loading on the fear of physical inadequacy 
factor include: being perceived as "gay," being perceived as having feminine traits, and 
losing in a sports competition. Items loading on the FORS under the fear of physical 
Table I 
Eisler and Colleagues ' Gender Role Stressors 
Male stressors 3 Female stressorst, 
1) Fear of physical inadequac y 1) Fear of unemotional relationships 
2) Fear of emotional expressiveness 2) Fear of being unattractive 
3) Fear of subordination to women 3) Fear of victimization 
4) Fear of intellectual inferiority 4) Fear of behaving assertively 
5) Fear of work/sex performance failure 5) Fear of not being nurturant 
3Eis ler & Skidmore, 1987. 6Gillespie & Eisler, 1992. 
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unattractiveness factor include: being perceived by others as overweight, being heavier 
than your mate , and being unusually tall. 
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Therefore, scenarios used in the MGRS and FGRS scales provide an empirical 
basis for the development of scenarios that are uniquely threatening to the identities of 
men and women. Situations representing these scales were developed for the present 
research and pilot tested to ensure that respondents did, in fact , find they were 
differentially threatening to the identities of men and women. Moreover, these unwanted 
identities can be developed into two types of scenarios: one set that "brings 
disadvantage" and another set that "does not bring disadvantage ." This allows the 
unwanted identity factor (the shame-eliciting condition) to be unconfounded from the 
disadvantage factor (the primary guilt-eliciting condition). When all of these scenarios 
are combined into one instrument, it represents a new measure , entitled the Gender 
Relevant TOSCA (GR-TOSCA). 
Based on the literature reviewed here , several predictions can be made about the 
relative guilt- and shame-proneness of men and women as measured by the new 
situations presented in the GR-TOSCA. Specifically, shame proneness is predicted to be: 
(a) greater for women than men when others are disadvantaged , (b) greater for women 
when a female-relevant identity (not involving disadvantaging others) is threatened, (c) 
greater for men than women when a male-relevant identity is threatened, and ( d) equal in 
men and women when comparisons are made between situations that neither uniquely 
threaten a man's nor a woman's identity. In terms of gender differences in guilt, women 
should score higher than men only when the situations involve disadvantage to another. 
CHAPTER III 
PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
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Ferguson and her associates' study demonstrates the need to separate the eliciting 
conditions of guilt from those of shame in a gender-sensitive manner. Their research 
clearly showed that the typically found gender differences in shame can be reversed if the 
biased nature of the stimulus situations used in the instrument is reversed as well. The 
proposed research will expand upon this line of inquiry, partially by attempting to 
replicate these findings, but also by employing a methodology that will further separate 
and independently analyze the heretofore confounded variables of "disadvanta ging 
others" versus "identity threats ." Additionally, the assertion that conformity to 
stereotypical gender roles is the basis for the gender differences in guilt- and shame-
proneness observed on the TOSCA-2 and in the new scenarios developed for this thesis 
wi ll be tested. The specific objectives of this research are therefore: 
1. To construct and investigate evidence for the psychometric integrity of the GR-
TOSCA, a scenario-based measure of guilt- and shame-proneness developed in this 
thesis. Along the lines suggested by the research of Alberico et al. (1998), it is proposed 
that these new scenarios should represent situations that: (a) threaten men 's versus 
women's identities while also additionally bringing disadvantage to others; (b) threaten 
men's versus women's identities while not bringing disadvantage to others; (c) bring 
disadvantage to others, but threaten neither men 's nor women's identities (beyond the 
disadvantage-brought feature of the situation); or (d) threaten neither men's nor women's 
identities while not bringing disadvantage to others. The psychometric integrity of this 
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new instrument will be assessed by providing evidence for the validity and reliability of 
the instrument. Validity will be assessed by correlating GR-TOSCA shame and guilt 
scores with similar scales from the TOSCA-2. Reliability of the GR-TOSCA will be 
assessed by determining the internal consistency of appropriate items and by examining 
test-retest correlations based upon a 3-week test-retest interval. 
2. To determine the extent to which scores on the GR-TOSCA are higher for shame 
proneness when the scenarios presented uniquely threaten the participants ' gender 
identities (versus when they do not), thereby replicating and expanding upon Ferguson 
and her colleagues ' research. A corollary of this objective is that these gender 
differences in shame should be accounted for by gender differences in ratings of 
unwanted identity. 
3. To determine the extent to which women score higher in guilt on the GR-TOSCA 
scenarios that bring disadvantage than scenarios that do not bring disadvantage . A 
corollary of this objective is that these gender differences in guilt should be accounted for 
by gender differences in the extent to which they perceive the situations as 
disadvantaging others. 
4. To determine the extent to which women and men ' s guilt and shame proneness scores 
are similar on those GR-TOSCA scenarios that are not uniquely threatening to men 
versus women ' s identities nor bring disadvantage to others. 
5. To determine the relationship of participants' endorsement of stereotypical gender 
personality characteristics to guilt- and shame-proneness on the TOSCA-2 and the GR-
TOSCA , thereby testing the assertion that the gender roles to which individuals subscribe 
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play a major role in impacting these scores. Individual differences in the extent to which 
traditional U.S. gender roles of masculinity versus femininity are endorsed (as measured 
by the Bern Sex Role Inventory [BSRI ; Bern, 1974]) should account for differences found 
in shame- and guilt-proneness . Individuals who endorse traditional feminine roles should 
report greater shame and guilt proneness. In contrast , those endorsing traditional 





Two-hundred and five participants (93 men and 109 women) were recruited from 
an undergraduate introductory psychology course at Utah State University (USU). 
Students enrolled in an introductory psychology course are representative of the 
demographics of students attending the university at large , because this class can be used 
to fulfill a breadth course designation of USU's University Studies requirement. 
According to USU's statistics, the average age of undergraduate students in the College 
of Education during 2000-2001 was 23.7 years (USU Fact Book , 2001). Ninety percent 
of these students were Caucasian. 
In exchange for their participation , participants were given extra credit points 
towards their course grade. Although it is plausible that the phenomena under 
investigation operate similarly in a broader population , generalizations of findings will be 
constrained to the population from which the sample is drawn. 
Procedure 
Participants were each provided with packets containing brief instructions , an 
informed consent form , and "bubble sheet" answer forms for the BSRI, TOSCA-2 and 
the GR-TOSCA (see Appendices A, B, C, and D). The instructions directed participants 
to a Hypertext Markup Language page (HTML) on the World Wide Web (WWW) that 
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provided the questions for each of the instruments. Participants read the questions on the 
HTML page and recorded their answers on their answer forms. For the GR-TOSCA, the 
order of both the scenarios and their corresponding questions were counterbalanced in 
three separate versions to help control for item order effects. Participants recorded their 
responses to the instruments by filling in bubbles that were later scanned and entered into 
a database with a scanner connected to a computer. 
Completely separate from the procedure mentioned above, 25 (21 female, 4 male) 
undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at USU completed 
the GR-TOSCA twice , 3 weeks apart. For this administration, the GR-TOSCA was 
converted into HTML and administered via the World Wide Web on the Internet. This 
Internet version of the GR-TOSCA was the same as the pencil-and-paper version, except 
that students marked their answers by clicking in "radio-buttons" instead of filling in 
response-bubbles with a pencil. Responses were automatically retrieved and entered into 
a database for analysis. 
Description of Instruments and Their Scale Scores 
The Test of Self-Conscious Affect-2 
The TOSCA-2 consists of 16 hypothetical scenarios representing transgressions 
and failures in family and work situations, such as: spilling red punch on a coworker 's 
new cream-colored carpet (and hiding the mistake) , breaking a lunch date , and making a 
mistake at work when people were depending on you (see Appendix D). On the TOSCA-
2, participants rated how likely they would be to react in several ways to each situation. 
Scores for guilt proneness were created by averaging scores on guilt keyed responses 
(min= 1, max = 5); scores for shame proneness were created by averaging scores on 
shame-keyed responses (min = 1, max = 5). 
Scores for guilt and shame proneness in the TOSCA-2 have been shown to be 
internally consistent (Cronbach 's alpha= .81 and . 78) by Ferguson and colleagues 
(2000). These results are similar to those reported by Tangney , Wagner , Hill-Barlow , 
Marschall , and Gramzow (l 996b) for the original TOSCA (Cronbach's alpha = .61 and 
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. 74 for guilt and shame proneness scores, respectively). Similar coefficient alphas were 
computed based on the current research data , resulting in alphas of .79 and .80 for guilt 
and shame proneness , respectively . Although published data explicitly examining the 
construct validity of the TOSCA-2 are unavailable , in-house data sets of Ferguson 's show 
that scores from the TOSCA-2 subscale s correlate very highly with the original TOSCA 
and the SCAAJ subscales (see also Tangney , 1996), the latter of which has been validated 
(Tangney , 1990) . 
The Gender Relevant Test of Self-Conscious Affect. 
The GR-TOSCA was developed for this thesis and is based on the TOSCA-2 and 
the research of Eisler and Skidmore (1987) and Gillespie and Eisler (1992 ; see Appendix 
B). The GR -TOSCA consists of22 scenarios presented in a similar format as items on 
the TOSCA-2. The feminine gender role stress and masculine gender role stress factors 
that Eisler and colleagues identified (listed in Table I) were used to identify the types of 
scenarios that could be constructed to uniquely threaten women's and men's identities. 
In addition, the GR-TOSCA included scenarios that are not differentially threatening to 
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men or women. These three categories of scenarios (male threatening, female 
threatening , not differentially gender threatening) were further subdivided into those that 
brought disadvantage and those that did not bring disadvantage. The resulting instrument 
therefore consists of six types of scenarios, written by this author. A group of initial 
scenarios meeting these criteria were piloted prior to the current research by presenting 
them to psychology undergraduate students and asking to what degree they represented 
an unwanted identity for men and women. 2 Scenarios that were not rated by these 
participants as expected were eliminated. 
An example of each of these scenario types is presented in Table 2. The factors 
from Eisler and his colleagues ' research (see Table 1) from which the gender-threatening 
scenarios were derived are noted in parentheses. Each type of scenario is labeled in 
Table 2 according to the particular threat that it represents. For example , scenarios that 
represent a male unwanted identity and bring disadvantage are labeled MUI , BD ; this 
labeling will hereafter be used to refer to these scenario types. 
Because some of the language used in the GR-TOSCA is gender specific , male 
and female versions were created by making slight language changes as necessary. For 
example , men were presented with a scenario that read , "At the same time your wife 
becomes a partner at a prestigious law firm , you are laid off your job and must stay home 
to watch the kids and take care of housekeeping. " In the female version of this scenario 
2 During pilot testing, participants from the same population were presented with potential GR-TOSCA 
scenarios and asked to what degree they thought these scenarios represented gender-relevant threats. 
Scenarios that were not found by these participants to be differentially gender threatening were eliminated 
from further consideration . 
Table 2 
Examples of Scenario Types in the GR-TOSCA 
Situation Type 
Male unwanted identity , 
doesn ' t bring disadvantage 
(MUI/DBD) 
Male unwanted identity , 
brings disadvantage 
(MUI/BD) 
Not differentially gender threatening , 
doesn ' t bring disadvantage 
(NUI/DBD) 




Example Scenario from GR-TOSCA 
"You ask a woman you know out on a 
date. She looks surprised , but accepts 
your invitation. When you ask about the 
surprised look, she responds , "Well , to 
be honest , I always thought you were 
homosexual. I guess it's because of the 
way you act sometimes." (Eisler's fear 
of physical inadequacy factor) 
"After a romantic evening , your spouse 
initiates sex . But for some reason , you 
are unable to respond sexually ." (Eisler's 
fear of work/sex performance failure 
factor) 
Even though you studied very hard , you 
failed a big test in one of your classes. 
"You ' re borrowing your friend ' s 
computer when an error message 
suddenly appears on the screen. Even 
though you don ' t know that much about 
computers , you try to fix the problem. 
Because of your inability to operate the 
computer , you erase all the files on the 
computer including your friend ' s 15 
page assignment that is due the next 
day. " 
(table continues) 
Fema le identity threatening, 
doesn't bring disadvantage 
(FUI/BDB) 
Female identity threatening, 
brings disadvantage 
(FUI , BD) 
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"Your best friend suddenly won't return 
you ca lls and seems to be avoiding you." 
(Eisler's fear of not being nurturant 
factor) 
"You promised your family to do some 
modeling, like you used to do in high 
school , to earn extra money to support 
your college education. Agencies won ' t 
hire you though , since you don ' t look the 
same anymore." (Eisler's fear of 
physical unattractiveness factor) 
the word "wife " was replace with "husband. " Similar changes were made to several of 
the scenarios to create a version of the instrument appropriate for use with males or with 
females. 
One of the primary purposes of this research was to investigate the psychometric 
properties of the GR-TOSCA. Therefore , reliability analyses for each of the subscales of 
the GR-TOSCA will be reported in the Results chapter. 
After reading each of the 22 GR-TOSCA scenarios, respondents rated the extent 
to which they would react in several different ways on 7-point scales (min = 1, max = 7).3 
Two of the reactions to each scenario were intended to be indicators of shame proneness 
and two were meant to represent guilt proneness. Specifically , shame was 
operationalized in each scenario as participants' ratings of (a) a shame cognition (e.g., 
"How much would you feel like a failure as a man/woman? "), and (b) a shame action 
3 Although the GR-TOSCA is modeled after the TOSCA-2, which uses 5-point sca les, 7-point scales were 
chosen for the GR-TOSCA to reduce the possibility of "tloor " or "cei ling" effects in responses. 
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tendency ( e.g., "How likely would you be to lower your head and avoid eye contact?"). 
Guilt was similarly operationalized as participants' ratings of (a) a guilt cognition (e.g., 
"How much would you worry that your significant other is embarrassed by your weight 
gain?), and (b) a guilt action tendency (e.g., "How much would you want to apologize to 
your friend?) . The correlations between the cognition and action components of the guilt 
and shame scales was substantial (for guilt r = .87,p < .001, for shame r = .82,p < .001). 
Therefore guilt and shame proneness scores were computed by adding these two 
components together. 
In addition to offering these ratings, participants were asked " In this situation, to 
what extent do you come across as possessing undesirable characteristics?," which was 
included as a check on the extent to which each situation represented an unwanted 
identity for participants. The exte nt to which participants perceiv ed themselves as 
disadvantaging others in the situation was assessed by having respondents rate "To what 
extent do you feel you caused trouble for others involved in the situation?" For each of 
the six types of scenarios, scores could thus be derived for shame proneness (average of 
two ratings) , guilt proneness (average of two ratings), perception of unwanted identities , 
and perception having disadvantaged others. 
Bern Sex Role Inventory 
Masculinity and femininity scores on the BSRI , short form (Bern, 1974; see 
Appendix C) were used to test the assertio n that possession of stereotypical gender 
personality characteristics plays a major role in determini ng scores on the TOSCA and 
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the GR-TOSCA. The short form version of this instrument was used to help minimize 
the time required for participants to complete all of the instruments presented to them . 
The BSRI short form (Bern, 1974; Lenny , 1991) consists of30 items describing 
personality characteristics that are stereotypically masculine ( e.g., assertive , strong 
personality) , feminine (e.g., affectionate, sympathetic), or filler (e.g. conscientious , 
moody). Participants rated each item in terms of how well it described them on a scale 
from "Neve r or almost never true " to "A lway s or almost always true". Scores were 
derived (min = 1, max = 7) for masculinity and for femininity by averaging participants' 
ratings on the 10 masculinity items and 10 femininity items. Lenny (199 1 ), who has 
summarized psychometric assessments of the BSRI , noted that , not only is it one of the 
most frequently used instruments to assess espo used sex roles , but it is also among the 
most frequently used psychological tests reviewed in The Mental Measurements 
Yearbook (M itchell & Burns , 1998) . Numerous studies investigating the BSRI have 
produced substantial evidence for its reliability (Bern , 1974 ; Rowland , 1977 ; Wilson & 
Cook, 1984; Yanico, 1985) and validity (Bern & Lewis , 1975 ; Liberman & Gaa, 1986 ; 
Orlofsky & Windle, 1978; Ramanaiah & Martin , 1984 ; Taylor, 1984; Taylor & Hall , 
1982 ; Wiggins & Holzmuller , 1981) . Bern (1974) also reported high internal consistency 
of the BSRI ; coefficient alpha was .86 for masculinity and .90 for femininity . Similar 
alphas were found for these sca les in the current research, which were .79 for masculinity 
and .92 for femininity. The masculinity and femininity scores were correlated at .43 




This chapter is organized into five sections, corresponding to the five objectives 
stated in the Purposes and Objectives chapter. These objectives were to: (a) examine the 
psychometric integrity of the GR-TOSCA; (b) examine whether shame scores were, 
indeed , higher when the gender relevant identity was threatened and whether this 
difference, if found, could be accounted for by gender differences in unwanted identity 
perceptions; ( c) examine whether women scored higher in guilt than men when their 
behavior was perceived to disadvantage another and whether this difference , if found , 
could be accounted for by gender differences in perceptions of disadvantaging others; ( d) 
exami ne whether gender differences in shame or guilt scores were small in size in 
situations not representing a gender-relevant threat or not bringing disadvantage to 
others ; and (e) examine the extent to which guilt or shame scores were substantially 
correlated with an accepted measure of sex role endorsement. Analyses and results 
bearing on each of these five objectives are detailed in the present chapter. 
The null hypotheses in this chapter were statistically tested using a .05 level of 
significance. This level of significance was selected based on the decision that a 
probability greater than 5% that the findings arose as a result of sampling error , if the null 
hypothesis is true , is unacceptable. Effect size estimates were also calculated to aid in the 
testing of hypotheses . These estimates were calculated by using Cohen's d, dividing the 
difference between the two scores being compared by the average of their standard 
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deviations (Cohen, 1988). 112 effect sizes were also used where appropriate .4 Because of 
the exploratory nature of this research, these estimates of the "degree to which the null 
hypothesis is false" (Cohen , 1988, p. 9-10) , were interpreted liberally , with values of .20 
or greater considered significant. The complex nature of the constructs examined in this 
exploratory research and the difficulties inherent in measuring them warrant the 
consideration of estimates of effect size traditionally defined as "small" (Stevens, 1999). 
Finally, because cell sizes varied somewhat as a result of the number of participants 
completing items on the instruments , cell sizes are reported with each statistical test. 
Objective 1: Manipulation Checks , Validity , 
and Reliability of the GR-TOSCA 
The first purpose of the thesis was to examine the effectiveness of the 
manipulations present in the GR-TOSCA and to examine evidence pertaining to the 
validity and reliability of the guilt and shame proneness scores derived from that 
instrument. Evidence bearing on this objective is presented below. 
Manipulation of Unwanted Identitie s and 
Disadvantaging Others 
Each of the 22 scenarios included in the GR-TOSCA was meant to represent one 
of six cells: MUI/DBD, FUI/DBD, NUI/DBD , MUI/BD, FUI/BD, NUI/BD (see Table 2). 
It is, of course, imperative to examine the effectiveness of these manipulations and to 
exclude scenarios from further analyses that did not adequately convey the intended 
4 l) 2 effect sizes that do not come close to approaching the minimum levels of significant are not reported. 
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manipulations. After considering various alternative criteria, a relatively simple criterion 
was adopted to decide whether a scenario did or did not adequately convey to participants 
that disadvantage had (or had not) been brought to another. Specifically , for each 
scenario, participants ' average rating of the degree to which others were disadvantaged in 
that scenario was calculated using the ratings of all participants. Scenarios with an 
average rating above four (the midpoint of the rating scale) were determined to bring 
disadvantage , whereas those with an average rating below four were determined to not 
bring disadvantage . For example , in one situation that was determined to bring 
disadvantage to others , participants were asked to imagine , "You were fired from your 
job two months ago for constantly being late. You ' re still not working and now you ' re 
unable to support your family. Your friends and family keep asking you , ' Are you ever 
going to get another job?' " In this case , the disadvantage being brought is the target not 
being able to support the family . In a scenario that was determined to not bring 
disadvantage to others , participants were asked to imagine , "You haven't been shopping 
in awhile. During a big sale , you grab a bunch of clothes of your normal size to go try 
on. You get to the dressing room and all of them are too small. " This scenario was 
deemed to not bring disadvantage in the sense of harming someone. To avoid confusion 
on the reader's part , it should be stressed that the first example also represents a male 
unwanted identity and the second example also represents a female unwanted identity. 
The criteria for deciding that a scenario was more threatening to one gender ' s 
identity than the other were more complex, as this selection process necessitated 
comparing participants' average rating of the degree to which each scenario represented 
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unwanted identities for men versus women. The gender relevancy of the unwanted 
identities represented in each scenario was examined by calculating paired /-tests 
between the scores of the extent to which a scenario was seen to be threatening to the 
"typical male" versus the "typical female" and by examining the effect sizes of these 
differences. Effect sizes of .20 and p values of less than .05 were used as cut-off values 
to determine which scenarios represented male- or female-relevant identity threats. 
Scenarios that failed to meet these standards were determined to not be differentially 
gender threatening. For example, a scenario that met the criteria for being a male- versus 
a female-relevant identity threat was: "You ask a woman/man you know out on a date . 
She/he looks surprised, but accepts your invitation. When you ask about the surprised 
look , she/he responds, ' Well , to be honest , I always thought you were homosexual. I 
guess it's because of the way you act sometimes'." This scenario represented a "male 
unwanted identity" threat , according to the criteria outlined above. In a scenario that met 
the criteria for being a female- versus a male-relevant identity threat , participants were 
asked to imagine , "Your doctor has just informed you that you are permanently sterile. " 
This scenario represented a "female-unwanted identity " threat , according to the criteria 
outlined above. 
Using these guidelines , 17 of the original 22 scenarios represented in the GR-
TOSCA met the selection criteria for defining the six types of scenarios that this 
instrument was meant to encompass. Only the 17 scenarios that fulfilled criteria are used 
in subsequent analyses. The breakdown of the 17 scenarios across the six cells is 
Table 3 
Number of GR-TOSCA Scenarios Representing Each Scenario Type 
Male Unwanted Identity (MUI) 
Female Unwanted Identity (FUI) 













presented in Table 3. This table shows that each cell will be represented by anywhere 
from two to five scenarios . 
As a verification that this selection procedure worked as expected , two 
multivariate analyses of variance (MANOV As) were conducted on the scores for 
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perceptions of unwanted identity and disadvantaging others from the GR-TOSCA. The se 
were 2 x 3 x 2 mixed-design MANOVAs , representing the factorial combination of 
Participant Gender (males versus female) x Gender Rele vant Threat (male unwanted 
identity versus female unwanted identity versus gender-neutral unwanted identity) x 
Disadvantage (brought disadvantage versus did not bring disadvantage) , treating the latter 
two as within subjects factors. These two MANOV As served as omnibus tests of the 
effectiveness of the two manipulations built into the GR-TOSCA. 
The dependent variable for the first MANOVA (n = 191) was the difference 
between participants ' rating of the extent to which the identity at issue in the scenarios 
would be threatening to a "typical male " versus a "typical female." Therefore , a positive 
difference score means that participants perceived the target scenario to be more 
threatening to males , and a negative difference score means that participants rated the 
identity as more threatening to females. A main effect for gender relevant threat was 
found, F(2, 188) = 84.15,p < .001, 112 = .47. In addition , there was a statistically 
significant Gender Relevant Threat x Disadvantage interaction , F (2, 188) = 151.09 , 
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p < .001, 112 = .62. Figure I displays the average difference scores (ratings of male 
unwanted identity -- ratings of female unwanted identity) for the stories representing each 
of the three unwanted identity cells , partitioned by whether disadvantage had or had not 
been brought. 
Figure 1 shows that, for both the BD and DBD levels of disadvantage , the 
scenarios in the male unwanted identity condition (MUI) were perceived to elicit greater 
unwanted identities in "typical" men than women ; those in the female unwanted identity 
condition (FUI) were perceived to elicit greater unwanted identities in "typical " women 
than men; those in the neutral condition (NUT) were not perceived to elicit differentially 
greater unwanted identities in either gender. Given the statistically significant Gender 
Relevant Threat x Disadvantage interaction , it was also important to ask whether the 
predicted differences in unwanted identity perceptions were found at each level of the 
disadvantage variable. This question can be addressed in multiple ways. For the thesis, a 
follow-up MANOV A was conducted on the unwanted identity difference scores at each 
level of the disadvantage variable, treating gender relevant threat as the only within-
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Figure 1. Average ratings of male unwanted identity minus female unwanted identity for 
all scenario types on the GR-TOSCA. 
Note. MUI = Male Unwanted Identity , FUI = Female Unwanted Identity 
significant quadratic component to these difference scores as a function of unwanted 
identity condition , that is, to ascertain whether the difference scores formed a "V" shape , 
with the scores for the MUI being positive, those for the FUI being negative , and those 
for the NUI being closer to zero . As would be expected , a significant quadratic effect of 
gender relevant threat was found when this analysis was conducted in the brought 
disadvantage cells only , F= (1, 200) = 241.53,p < .001 , 1i2= .49, and when the analysis 
was conducted in the did not bring disadvantage cells only, F = (1,200) = 223.60, p < 
.001, 1i2= .47. In short, the expected pattern was obtained in both types of disadvantage 
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cells (as seen in Figure 1 ), but the effect was somewhat, though negligibly , stronger when 
disadvantage had been brought. 
To ascertain whether participants perceived the scenarios to differ in the extent to 
which someone had been disadvantaged, a mixed design 2 x 3 x 2 MANOV A (Gender x 
Gender Relevant Threat x Disadvantage) was conducted on the average scores for ratings 
of how much the scenarios "caused trouble " for others (n = 192). Statistically significant 
effects were found for the disadvantage variable, F (1, 190) = 489 .29 , p < .001 , ri2 = .54, 
the gender relevant threat variable, F (2, 189) = 55.82 , p < .001 , 1/ = .75, and the 
Disadvantage x Gender Relevant Threat interaction , F (2, 189) = 88.54 , p < .001 , 
112 = .34. The main effect for disadvantage revealed that participants perceived that more 
trouble was caused for others when disadvantage had been brought (M = 4 .85, SD = 1.02) 
than when disadvantage had not been brought (M = 3 .21, SD = 1.3 ), indicating a 
successful manipulation . The main effect for gender relevant threat indicated that 
participants perceived more trouble to have been caused for others in the MUI scenarios 
(M = 4.36 , SD = 1.21) than in either the FUJ (M = 3.79 , SD= 1.17) or NUI scenarios 
(M = 3.94 , SD = 1.12). However , as seen in Figure 2, the Gender Relevant Threat x 
Disadvantage interaction actually indicates the largest difference in the NUI condition , 
that is, when comparing ratings of perceived trouble in the "brought disadvantage " to 
"did not bring disadvantage" cells , this difference was largest in the NUI cells. All in all , 
the disadvantage manipulation was successful at each level of gender relevant threat 
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Figure 2. Average ratings of perception of bringing disadvantage for all scenario types 
on the GR-TOSCA. 
Note. MUI = Male Unwanted Identity , FUI = Fema le Unwan ted Identity. 
These manipulations were successfu l, although it is also obvious that it was 
difficult to independently manipulate the supposed shame inducing factor (unwanted 
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identity vis a vis gen der relevant threat) and the purported gui lt inducing factor (bri nging 
disadva ntage). 
Internal Consistency Reliability of the GR-TOSCA 
To examine the reliabilit y of the GR-TOSCA sham e and guilt proneness scores, 
as well as the ratings of unwanted identity and disad vantaging others , Cronbach's alpha 
Table 4 
Internal Consistency of GR-TOSCA Subscales. 
GR-TOSCA Subscale Alpha n 
Disadvantaging others .85 202 
Unwanted identity .90 204 
Shame .91 194 
Guilt .90 200 
(as a measure of internal consistency) was calculated for these scores for each of the six 
types of scenarios that met criteria. Table 4 shows that the alphas for these shame and 
guilt proneness scores were good by most standards (e.g., Nunnally , 1967, 1978; 
Thorndike & Hagen , 1977), ranging from .85 to .91. 
Test-retest reliabilit y of the Gender Relevant 
Test of Self-Conscious Affect 
To ascertain the test-retest reliability of the GR-TOSCA scale scores , 25 (21 
40 
female , 4 male) undergraduate students enrolled in an introductory psychology course at 
Utah State University completed the GR-TOSCA twice , three weeks apa11. The low 
number of males in this sample was apparently due to an overall low volunteer rate and 
the disproportionate number of women enrolled in the course at that time. Pearson 
product-moment correlations were calculated between the ratings that were provided at 
the two testing periods. As seen in Table 5, the test-retest correlation coefficients were 
remarkably high, ranging from .78 to .83. All coefficients were statistically significant 
Table 5 




Disadvantaging others .78 






(p < .001). All in all , the internal consistency and test-retest reliability of the GR-
TOSCA subscales are very acceptable by current psychometric standards. 
Concurrent Validity of the GR-TOSCA 
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To provide evidence for the concurrent validity of the GR-TOSCA scenarios , it 
was necessary to demonstrate that the shame proneness scores (and guilt proneness 
scores) from this instrument were substantially related to comparable scores from an 
already accepted instrument , the TOSCA-2. To examine this evidence for concurrent 
validity , the zero-order bivariate correlation coefficients were computed between scale 
scores on the GR-TOSCA and comparable scales from the TOSCA-2. In addition to 
these zero-order calculations , first -order (also known as "part") correlation coefficients 
were computed, in which the variance shared with shame was residualized from guilt and 
vice versa in each instrument. The use of part correlations is standard practice in this 
literature, because researchers often find that guilt proneness is moderately correlated 
with shame proneness (Tangney, Burggraf & Wagner, 1995; Tangney et al., 1996b; 
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Tangney , Wagner , Fletcher & Gramzow, 1992; Tangney, 1995b). In the present sample , 
there was actually a considerable amount of variance shared in common between the guilt 
proneness and shame proneness scores. The zero-order Pearson product moment 
correlations between guilt and shame proneness scores in this sample ( calculated across 
the 1 7 scenarios that met the selection criteria) were substantial , with the r being .60 for 
the TOSCA-2, (df = 201,p <.001) and with the r being .83 for the GR-TOSCA (df= 190, 
p < .001 ). Clearly, there is considerable overlap in participants ' ratings of these two 
emotions , at least as operationalized in these instruments. 
To gain an overall picture of the evidence for the concurrent validity of the GR-
TOSCA, zero-order and part correlation coefficients were computed for various scores 
across the TOSCA-2 and GR-TOSCA instruments . Specifically, the zero-order 
correlation coefficients represent the Pearson product moment correlations between 
scores on one instrument (e.g. , TOSCA-2 guilt) and those on the other instrument (e.g. , 
GR-TOSCA guilt). The part correlation coefficients computed are the Pearson product 
moment correlation between (a) scores on one instrument (e.g., TOSCA-2 guilt) once 
residualized for its emotion counterpart on the same instrument (e.g. , TOSCA-2 shame) 
with (b) the scores on the other instrument (e.g., GR-TOSCA guilt) once residualized for 
its emotion counterpart (e.g., GR-TOSCA shame). The results of these analyses are 
reported in Table 6. 
To provide further evidence for the validity of the GR-TOSCA , it was also 
important to determine if these correlations were statistically significantly different from 
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Table 6 
Relation of GR-TOSCA and TOSCA-2 Guilt and Shame Proneness Scores 
GR-TOSCA 
Zero-order Part 
TOSCA-2 Shame Guilt Shame Guilt 
Shame .78a1** 6" I** . ., b .6la 1** "4 I** . ., b 
Guilt .51/** .65c1** -.41/** .51/** 
Note. Within each group , correlations in a row that do not share identical subscripts, or 
those within a column that do not share identical superscripts, differ significantly at 
p < .05. The cell sizes for these analyses ranged from 186 to 202. 
** p < .001. 
each other , where appropriate . For example , although the part correlation between GR-
TOSCA shame and TOSCA-2 shame should be positive and statistically significant , the 
part correlation between GR-TOSCA shame and TOSCA-2 guilt should be statistically 
significantly lower and /or negative. Hotelling ' s I tests were , therefore , conducted to test 
for the equality of these dependent correlation coefficients , where appropriate. The 
results of these analyses are also reported in Table 6. 
The question being addressed in Table 6 is whether across instruments 
correlations between what is supposedly the "same " construct ( e.g. , TOSCA-2 shame 
correlated with GR-TOSCA shame) are higher than across instrument correlations of 
what is supposedly a "different " construct ( e.g. , TOSCA-2 shame correlated with GR-
TOSCA guilt). If one examines the zero-order (and part) correlation coefficients in Table 
6, it is seen that TOSCA-2 shame and GR-TOSCA shame scores are more highly 
correlated than are TOSCA-2 guilt and GR-TOSCA shame scores and than are TOSCA-2 
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shame and GR-TOSCA guilt scores. This provides evidence for the concurrent validity 
of the shame scores. Concurrent validity of the guilt scores is also apparent , especially in 
the part correlation results. Specifically , the zero-order correlation coefficient between 
TOSCA-2 guilt and GR-TOSCA guilt is greater than that between TOSCA-2 guilt and 
GR-TOSCA shame , but it is not greater than the zero-order correlation between TOSCA-
2 shame and GR-TOSCA guilt. Nonetheless , the part correlations show that TOSCA-2 
and GR-TOSCA guilt are much more positively associated than either of the cross-
correlations. The general conclusion , therefore , is that there is good concurrent validity 
evidence for the guilt and shame scales from the GR-TOSCA , especially after the strong 
common variance shared by guilt and shame , either due to method similarity or construct 
overlap, is accounted for. It should also be noted that there is considerable evidence from 
the part compared to zero order correlation coefficients that suppressor effects are 
operating , revealing a need to conduct the additional analyses for this thes is on the 
residualized scores . 
The correlational analyses outlined above were then conducted for subsets of the 
GR-TOSCA scenarios to examine specific predictions bearing on gender differences in 
the magnitude of the correlations as a function of whether the situations were gender 
threatening or brought disadvantage to another . Tables 7 through 9 provide detailed 
information regarding these correlations as well as statistical tests (Hotelling ' s t) of the 
equality ofrelevant dependent correlations. To briefly summarize the wealth of findings 
depicted in these tables , the reader will note that all of the predictions were borne out , 
with the exception of those made for the MUI/BD cell and the NUI/DBD cell. 
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Table 7 
Relation Between Women 's Guilt and Shame Proneness Scores on the TOSCA-2 and GR-











GR-TOSCA NUI/BD Scenarios, n = 101 
Shame residual Guilt residual 
.57a** 
GR-TOSCA FUI/BD Scenarios, n = 104 
Shame residual Guilt residual 
.62a ** 
-.30a** 
Note. Correlations within a row that do not share identical subscripts differ significantly 
atp < .05 . 
*p < .05. **p <.01. 
It was predicted that women's guilt and shame proneness scores on the TOSCA-2 
would positively correlate with GR-TOSCA guilt and shame proneness scores on 
scenarios that (a) bring disadvantage and are not differentially gender threatening 
(scenarios in the NUI/BD cell) , and (b) bring disadvantage and are uniquely threatening 
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to women's identities (scenarios in the FUI/BD cell). Table 7 shows that the part 
correlations between women's corresponding emotion scores (i.e., TOSCA-2 and GR-
TOSCA guilt or TOSCA-2 and GR-TOSCA shame) are high and differ statistically 
significantly from women ' s "opposing " emotion scores (i.e., TOSCA-2 guilt with GR-
TOSCA shame or TOSCA-2 shame with GR-TOSCA guilt). 
Table 8 
Relation Between Women's Guilt and Shame Proneness Scores on the TOSCA-2 and GR-











GR-TOSCA NUI/DBD Scenarios, n = 102 
Shame residual Guilt residual 
.33a ** .14a 
-.09a .09a 
GR-TOSCA MUI/DBD Scenarios, n = 103 
Shame residual Guilt residual 
-.19a 
Note. Correlations within a row that do not share identical subscripts differ significantly 
at p < .05. *p < .05. **p <.01. 
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Women's guilt and shame proneness scores on the TOSCA-2 were also correlated 
with GR-TOSCA guilt and shame proneness scores on scenarios that (a) do not bring 
disadvantage and are not differentially gender threatening (NUI/DBD), and (b) do not 
bring disadvantage and are uniquely threatening to men's identities (MUI/DBD). These 
correlations are shown in Table 8. Because disadvantaging others represents an 
additional unwanted identity for women, the correlations between women's guilt and 
shame proneness scores on the GR-TOSCA and the TOSCA-2 were predicted to be 
higher for those situations that bring disadvantage. The correlations for scenarios 
NUI/DBD and NUI/DB in Tables 8 and 9, indeed , show that this is the case . Hotelling ' s 
t demonstrated that the correlations for both shame , t (98) = 2. 73, p < .001 , and guilt , 
t (102) = 4.62 , p < .00 I , were statistically significantly different. 
It was also predict ed that the correlations between women ' s guilt and shame 
proneness scores on the GR-TOSCA and the TOSCA-2 would be higher for those 
scenarios that represent a female unwanted identity and bring disadvantage (FUI/BD) 
than those scenarios that represent a male unwanted identity and do not bring 
disadvantage (MUI/DBD). Again , the correlations presented in Tables 8 and 9 show this 
to be the case. Hotelling ' s t demonstrated that the correlations for both shame, 
t (104) = 3.81 , p < .001, and guilt , t (101) = 2.81 , p = .003 , were statistically significantly 
different. Table 8 also shows that the part correlations between women's corresponding 
emotion scores are not consistently significantly different from their "opposing" emotion 
scores. 
Table 9 
Relation Be/ween Men 's Guilt and Shame Proneness Scores on the TOSCA-2 and GR-











GR-TOSCA NUI /BD Scenarios, n = 88 
Shame residual Guilt residual 
.60a ** -.36b * * 
-.35a ** .54b** 
GR-TOSCA MUI/BD Scenarios, n = 89 
Shame residual Guilt residua l 
.25a * .03a 
-.01 a .04a 
Note. Co rrelat ion s within a row that do not share identical subscript s differ sign ificant ly 
atp< .05. 
*p < .05. **p <.01. 
Men 's scores on the TOSCA-2 were predicted to positivel y correlate with GR-
TOSCA scores on scenarios that (a) bring disadvantage and are not differentially gender 
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threatening (NUI/BD), and (b) bring disadvantage and are uniquel y threatening to men 's 
identities (MUI/BD). These correlations are presented in Table 9. Although men 's guilt 
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and shame proneness scores for the NUI/BD scenarios correlate highly with TOSCA-2 
guilt and shame proneness scores, only the shame proneness scores reached the .05 level 
of statis tical significance for the GR-TOSCA MUI/BD scenarios. Because the 
correlations between men's TOSCA-2 and GR-TOSCA guilt and shame proneness scores 
were suspiciously low, scatterplots were visually inspected for nonlinear relationships. 
These visual inspections did not suggest that these variables were related in a nonlinear 
fashion. Table 9 also shows that the part correlations between men's corresponding 
emotion scores are significantly different from their "opposing " emotion scores only for 
the NUl/BD scenarios. 
To summarize, these correlations provide substantial evidence for the concurrent 
validity of the GR-TOSCA. The overall correlations between the TOSCA-2 and GR-
TOSCA guilt and shame scores, indicate that the two instruments appear to be measuring 
the same constructs. Furthermore, specific predictions (except where noted) regarding 
ihese correlations were also borne out , indicating that the manipulations of disadvantage 
and gender relevant threat built into the GR-TOSCA function at least partly as expected 
in terms of their effect on guilt and shame proneness scores. 
Objective 2: Gender Differences in Shame 
Proneness Scores on the GR-TOSCA 
The secon d objective of this thesis was to examine whether gender differences in 
shame would be found only when the gender-relevant identity was threatened. The 
questions specifically addressed were: (a) were women ' s shame proneness scores on the 
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GR-TOSCA higher than men ' s in the FUI condition? (b) were men's shame proneness 
scores on the GR-TOSCA higher than women's in the MUI condition? and (c) was there 
no significant gender difference for shame proneness scores in the NUI condition? 
Together , these three questions imply that a statistically significant Gender x Gender 
Relevant Threat interaction should have been found for participants ' shame ratings. To 
address this objective, participants' averaged ratings of the degree to which they thought 
scenarios would elicit shame-related behaviors and cognitions were subjected to a mixed-
design 2 x 3 x 2 MANOV A, representing the factorial combination of Gender (male 
versus female) x Gender Relevant Threat (male unwanted identity versus female 
unwanted identity versus gender-neutral unwanted identity) x Disadvantage (brought 
disadvantage versus did not bring disadvantage) , treating the latter two as within-subjects 
variables (n = 187). 
Importantly , the anticipated Gender x Gender Relevant Threat interaction was not 
found for the shame proneness scores , which failed to support the predictions derived 
from the second objective . This MANOVA did, however , reveal a statistically 
significant main effect for the gender relevant threat variable , F (2, 184) = 60.42 , 
p < .001, ri2 = .40. Participants ' average shame proneness scores resulting from the 
scenarios in the NUI cell (M = 4.13, SD = 1.06) were lower than those resulting from 
scenarios in both the FUI (M = 4.51, SD = 1.1) and MUI (M = 4.39 , SD= 1.23) cells. 
There was also a main effect for the disadvantage variable, F =(I, 185) = 307.85, 
p < .001, ri2= .63. The average shame proneness scores derived from scenarios in the did 
not bring disadvantage cells (M = 4.04, SD= 1.19) were lower than those resulting from 
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the brought disadvantage scenarios (M = 4.64, SD= 1.06). Finally, there was a 
significant interaction between the disadvantage variable and the gender-relevant threat 
variable , F = (2, 184) = 10.24 , p < .001, ri2 = .10. Although the main effect of the 
disadvantage variable revealed that shame ratings were greater when the event brought 
disadvantage to another, the Gender Relevant Threat x Disadvantage interaction 
suggested that the latter difference appeared for the MUI and NUI scenarios but was the 
opposite for the FUI scenarios . Figure 3 displays these results. 
To confirm whether there was a simple main effect of the disadvantage variable at 
each level of the gender relevant threat variable , three MANOVAs and effect sizes were 
calculated for participants ' shame proneness scores. As expected, there was a significant 
main effect for the disadvantage variable at the MUI level, F ( 1, 201) = 152.8 , 
p < .001 , 112 = .43 , and at the NUI level , F (1 , 197) = 263 .16, p < .001 , ri2 = .57 . There was 
also a significant main effect of the disadvantage variable at the FUI level , 
F ( 1, 201) = 22 .66 , p < .001 , 112 = .10 with shame ratings statistically significantly higher 
for the DBD cell than the BD cell. This latter finding was particularly unexpected . 
Although the difference between shame ratings was statistically significant , the effect 
size is relatively small. 
A corollary of the second objective was to examine whether any gender 
differences in shame proneness could be accounted for by gender differences in 
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Figure 3. Average shame ratings for all scenario types on the GR-TOSCA. 
Note. MUI = Male Unwanted Identity , FUI = Female Unwanted Identity 
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difference in shame proneness , results pertaining to the corollary did not need to be fully 
examined. It should be remembered , however , that the analyses pertaining to the 
effectiveness of the shame-inducing condition (i.e., perceptions of whether the scenarios 
represented "unwanted identities ") did not reveal any gender differences in perceptions of 
these threats . It could be argued, therefore , that the absence of gender differences in the 
perception of unwanted identities in the different conditions is what contributed to the 
failure to find gender differences in shame proneness. 
The failure to find the anticipated gender differences in shame proneness on the 
GR-TOSCA led the author to ask whether there was evidence for gender differences in 
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shame proneness on the more widely accepted instrument used in this area, the TOSCA-
2. To address this issue , a one-way ANOVA was also calculated to determine whether 
men's and women's shame proneness scores on the TOSCA-2 are significantly different, 
as would be expected from the literature. This test revealed that the difference between 
women's and men's shame proneness scores on the TOSCA-2 were not statistically 
significantly different in this sample, F(I , 196) = .01,p = .93, 112 = .00. Results in the 
present sample are not showing the expected gender difference in shame proneness, even 
on an instrument widely used in the literature, and on which gender differences in shame 
proneness are typically found. 
To summarize the findings pertaining to the second objective: the prediction that 
there would be a Gender x Gender Relevant Threat interaction would be found for shame 
proneness scores was not supported. Even more surprising was the fact that participants ' 
average shame ratings for the FUI/DBD cell were higher than those for the FUI/BD cell. 
Objective 3: Gender Differences in Guilt 
Proneness Scores on the GR-TOSCA 
The third objective of the thesis was to examine whether women scored higher in 
guilt proneness on the GR-TOSCA than men when their behavior was perceived to 
disadvantage another. A corollary to the third objective was to ask whether any obtained 
gender differences in guilt proneness could be accounted for by gender differences in 
perceptions of disadvantaging others. To address whether there were gender differences 
in guilt proneness, participants' average ratings of the degree to which they thought 
54 
scenarios would elicit guilt-related behaviors and cognitions were subjected to a mixed-
design 2 x 3 x 2 MANOV A, representing the factorial combination of Gender (male 
versus female) x Gender Relevant Threat (male unwanted identity versus female 
unwanted identity versus gender-neutral unwanted identity) x Disadvantage (brought 
disadvantage versus did not bring disadvantage) , treating the latter two as within subjects 
factors (n = 187). 
As with the shame proneness scores, there were no statistically significant effects 
of gender or interaction of gender with either the gender relevant threat or the 
disadvantage variables for participants ' guilt proneness scores. This indicates that the 
predictions derived for Objective 3 were not supported. A statistically significant main 
effect was found for the gender-relevant threat variable , F (2, 190) = 130.37, p < .001, 
112 = .58 . Participants ' average guilt ratings were highest for the scenarios in the FUI cell 
(M = 5.32, SD = 1), second highest for scenarios in he NUI cell (M = 4.94, SD = 1.01), 
and lowest for those scenarios in the MUI cell (M = 4.67, SD = 1.11 ). A statistically 
significant main effect was also found for the disadvantage variable for the guilt ratings, 
F = (1, 1 91) = 4 21. 13, p < . 000, ri2 = . 3 1. Across all three unwanted identity cells (MUI, 
FUI and NUI) participants' guilt ratings were statistically significantly higher for those 
scenarios that additionally brought disadvantage (M= 5.46, SD= .95) than those that did 
not (M = 4.50, SD= 1. I 3). Finally, a statistically significant interaction was found 
between the gender relevant threat variable and the disadvantage variable , 
F(2 , 190) = 40.75 , p < .001, 112 = .65. As Figure 4 illustrates, this interaction reflects the 
fact that guilt was rated higher in the brought disadvantage cell than in the did not bring 
disadvantage cell , especially when the scenarios threatened a FUI as opposed to 
threatening a MUI or a NUI. 
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A corollary of the third objective was to examine whether any gender differences 
in guilt ratings could be accounted for by gender differences in the perceptions of 
disadvantaging others. Because the above analysis did not reveal a gender difference in 
guilt, results pertaining to the corollary did not need to be examined. As with the shame 
ratings , the most important prediction for this objective , that there would be a Gender x 
Gender Relevant Threat interaction was not supported. The failure to find any significant 
gender differences in guilt proneness on the GR-TOSCA led the author to ask whether 
there were gender differences in guilt on the more widely accepted TOSCA-2, as would 
be expected from the literature. The one-way ANOV A, treating gender as the between 
subjects factor, of participants TOSCA-2 guilt proneness scores revealed that the 
difference between women's and men 's guilt proneness scores on the TOSCA-2 were not 
statistically significantly different in this sample, F(I, 193) = .16, p = .69, 112 = .00. This 
result may shed some light on the nonsignificant gender effects in the guilt MANOV A 
above but indicating that the participants ' responses differ in important ways from those 
typically found in the guilt literature. Results in the present sample are not showing the 
expected gender difference in guilt proneness , even on an instrument widely used in the 
literature, and on which gender differences in guilt proneness are typically found. 
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Figure 4. Average guilt ratings for all sce nario types on the GR-TOSCA. 
No te. MUI = Male Unwanted Identity , FUI = Female Unwanted Identity . 
Objective 4: Gender Differences in Guilt and Shame Proneness Scores 
on the GR-TOSCA as a Function of Gender-Relevant Threat 
The fourth objective of the thesis was to examine whether gender differences in 
shame or guilt scores are small in size in situations not representing a gender-relevant 
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threat or not bringing disadvantage to others. As was seen from the MANOV As reported 
earlier, there were no statistically significant effects of gender for the analyses of the 
shame or the guilt scores. The failure to find statistically significant effects of gender 
could reflect a problem with power or it could simply mean that the gender differences 
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are weak in magnitude . As one further check, Cohen's d effect sizes were calculated for 
the differences between males ' and female guilt and shame scores on the GR-TOSCA for 
each level of the gender relevant threat variable (MUI, FUI, and NUI) and the 
disadvantage variable (BD and DBD). These effect sizes are reported in Table I 0, which 
clearly shows that men's and women's guilt and shame proneness scores on each of the 
situation types in the GR-TOSCA do not differ significantly; none of the effect sizes 
approached the a priori effect size significance level of .20. 
Table IO 
Effect Sizes.for the Differences Between Men's and Women's Guilt and Shame Scores on 
the GR-TOSCA 
Cohen 's d 
Scenario Type Shame Guilt 
MUI .08 .01 
FUI .04 .09 
NUI .01 .13 
BD .04 .14 
DBD .01 .01 
Note. MUI= Male Unwanted Identity , FUI = Female Unwanted Identity, NUI = Gender 
Neutral Unwanted Identity , BD = Brings Disadvantage , DBD = Doesn 't Bring 
Disadvantage. 
Objective 5: Relationship Between Sex Role 
Endorsement, Guilt, and Shame 
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The fifth objective of the thesis was to ascertain the relationship between 
participants ' endorsement of stereotypical gender personality characteristics and their 
guilt and shame proneness scores on the TOSCA-2 and the GR-TOSCA, thereby testing 
the assertion that the gender roles to which individuals subscribe play a major role in 
impacting these scores. 
In the literature that discusses the possible reasons women are typically found to 
be more guilt and shame prone than men , one argument is that women (relative to men) 
are often more sensitive to identity threats and are more sensitive to causing problems 
for others. The tendenc y to endorse so-called "feminin e" gender role traits is, in fact, 
frequently operationalized in precisely these ways. For example, on the BSRI , a person 
who endorses feminine traits is one who professes beliefs about the self that correspond 
to shame-relevant behaviors (e.g., shy, yielding) and that would endorse guilt-relevant 
actions because they have hurt others (e.g. , eager to soothe hurt feelings). On the other 
hand , a person who endorses masculine traits on the BSRI is not professing to be very 
sensitive to shame- or guilt-relevant concerns (e.g. , some of the BSRI items that indicate 
masculinit y are willing to take a stand , self-reliant, or aggressive). 
It was , therefore , expected that , in this sample, men would score higher on the 
masculininty scale of the BSRI than women , and women would score higher on the 
femininity scale of the BSRI than men . As with the other hypotheses regarding gender 
differences in this thesis , the resu lts were not as expected . Neither difference between 
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men's and women's scores on BSRI masculinity, F(l, 194) = 2.09 , p = .15, 112 = .01, nor 
the difference between men's and women's scores on BSRI femininity, F(l , 196) = 1.17, 
p = .28, 112 = .01, were significant. 
Examined next were the hypotheses that (a) BSRI femininity would be positively 
correlated with both guilt and shame proneness , and (b) the latter scores should be 
negatively correlated with BSRI masculinity scores. To test these hypotheses , scores on 
the BSRI masculinity and femininity scales were correlated with shame and guilt 
proneness scores on the TOSCA-2 and the GR-TOSCA. Both zero-order and pa11 
co1Telations were calculated to test these predictions . Hotelling's I tests were also 
calculated to test the equality of these correlations, as appropriate. The results are 
presented in Table 11. 
Table 11 
Corre lation s of BSRI Masculinity (BSRI M) and Femininity (BSRJ F) Subsca les with 




(zero-order) (resid . for guilt) 
TOSCA-2 Guilt 
(zero-order) (resid. for shame) 
Note. Correlations within a column that do not share identical superscripts differ 
significantly at p < .05. 
Cell Ns range from 201-205. 
*p < .05. **p <.01. 
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Table 11 shows that these predictions were only partially supported. The negative 
correlation between participants' BSRI masculinity scores and TOSCA-2 shame 
proneness scores was significant (when shame was residualized for guilt), as predicted , 
but the significant positive correlations between BSRI masculinity and TOSCA-2 guilt 
proneness scores (both zero-order and residualized for shame) was unexpected . The 
BSRI femininity scores were positively correlated with TOSCA-2 zero-order shame 
proneness scores; however , once TOSCA-2 shame was residualized for guilt, this 
correlation was reversed . Participants ' BSRI femininity scores were, as predicted, 
significantly positively correlated with TOSCA-2 guilt proneness scores (both zero-order 
and residualized for shame) . All things considered, the most salient finding was that a 
tendency to endorse feminine traits as measured by the BSRI was strongly related to the 
tendency to endorse guilt-relevant responses on the TOSCA-2. 
Pearson product moment correlation coefficients were also computed between the 
BSRI femininity and masculinity subscales and the shame and guilt proneness scores 
from the GR-TOSCA. The hypothese s to be tested were that shame proneness scores on 
the GR-TOSCA would be positively associated with BSRI femininity but negatively 
associated with BSRI masculinity. Both zero-order and part correlations were calculated 
to test these predictions. Hotelling's t tests were also calculated to test the equality of 
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(zero-order) (resid. for guilt) 
GR-TOSCA Guilt 
(zero-order) (resid. for shame) 
Note. Correlations within a column that do not share identical superscripts differ 
significantly at p < .05. 
Cell Ns range from 192-204. 
*p < .05. **p <.01. 
Table 12 shows that the predictions made regarding the GR-TOSCA in 
relationship to BSRI masculinity and femininity were only partially confirmed. Scores 
for masculinity were negatively correlated with shame proneness (as predicted) , at least 
01:ce shame proneness was residualized for its association with guilt proneness. 
However , guilt proneness was actually positively associated with masculinity for both the 
unresidualized and residualized guilt scores. The latter finding is counter to predictions. 
Shame proneness scores were positively correlated with BSRI femininity scores for the 
zero-order correlations , but negatively correlated for the part correlations, another finding 
that runs counter to prediction. However , femininity scores were positively associated 
with guilt proneness , as predicted. In all , if one bases conclusions primarily on the part 
correlations, which provide the most uncontaminated test of each emotion's relationship 
to gender role ascriptions, shame proneness is negatively linked to masculine and 
feminine endorsements, whereas guilt proneness is positively linked to masculine and 





The analyses reported for Objective 1 in the Results chapter of the thesis provide 
some encouraging evidence for the validity and reliability of the GR-TOSCA. Although 
not all of the hypotheses regarding validity and reliability were supported, the evidence 
indicated that the scenarios within the GR-TOSCA appeared to be consistently measuring 
the constructs they were intended to measure . 
Seventeen of these original 22 scenarios were retained in the instrument based on 
participants ' ratings of the degree to which the scenarios represented each of the six cells 
intended. This selection process left the MUJ/BD, MUI/DBD and NUI /DBD conditions 
with only two scenarios representing them. Ideally , each condition would have contained 
a greater (and equal) number of scenarios , but creating situations that were perceived by 
participants as intended was a challenging task. The fact that the 22 scenarios used in the 
thesis had already been pilot-tested and selected from an even larger pool of scenarios 
indicated that the selection of the "best " scenarios for the GR-TOSCA was an ongoing 
process. Future versions of the GR-TOSCA should present additional scenarios in each 
of the cells. Nonetheless , the MANOV As conducted as omnibus tests of the 
manipulations of disadvantage and gender relevant threat indicated that the 17 remaining 
scenarios represented each of the six scenarios types, as intended. 
These scenarios selected for the GR-TOSCA also appeared to be reliable in their 
measurement. A test of internal consistency showed that the shame proneness, guilt 
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proneness , unwanted identity and disadvantage subscales all performed very well in this 
regard. A test-retest analysis also suggested that participants' scores on the GR-TOSCA 
remained very stable over a 3-week period. This finding, however , was limited 
somewhat by the lack of males in the test-retest sample. 
Based on this evidence, the GR-TOSCA appeared to be reliable in its 
measurement. But was it actually measuring guilt and shame proneness? Substantial 
evidence for the concurrent validity of the instrument was provided by correlating 
participants' guilt and shame proneness scores (overall) on the GR-TOSCA with that of 
the TOSCA-2. These correlations showed that these scales from the GR-TOSCA 
correlated highly with the same scales of the TOSCA-2, especially after the strong 
common variance shared by guilt and shame was accounted for. A more critical 
demonstration of the internal validity of the GR-TOSCA than these overall correlations 
was the correlations of the guilt and shame proneness scores derived from the specific 
scenario types on the GR-TOSCA with the guilt and shame proneness scores on the 
TOSCA-2. The reader will recall that the GR-TOSCA was designed to redress the 
confound hypothesized to exist in the TOSCA-2 between gender-specific unwanted 
identities and disadvantaging others. Therefore it was important to support specific 
hypotheses regarding how the guilt and shame proneness scores derived from specific 
scenario types on the GR-TOSCA correlated with the guilt and shame proneness scores 
on the TOSCA-2 . All but two of these hypotheses were supported by these correlations, 
providing further support for the internal validity of the GR-TOSCA. 
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The GR-TOSCA developed for this thesis was thus shown to perform well in 
terms of the criteria that needed to be met to establish its internal consistency reliability , 
test-retest reliability (albeit with a sample of primarily women) , representation of 
different types of identity threats, ability to differentiate guilt-inducing conditions , and 
thus its validity as a measure of guilt and shame proneness. The question still remained , 
however , as to whether the GR-TOSCA was a valid indication of the types of situations 
in which women relative to men actually evidenced more guilt or shame proneness , 
which was the focal question addressed in Objectives 2, 3, and 4. The reader will recall 
that scenarios were selected to represent the MUI, FUI , and NUI cells based on 
participants ' ratings of the degree to which these scenarios represented unwanted 
identities for men and women or neither. Participants reported that scenarios in the MUI 
condition were a greater unwanted identity for men , that scenarios in the FUI condition 
were a greater unwanted identity for women , and that scenarios in the NUI condition 
were not differentiated as gender-relevant unwanted identities. It was, therefore , 
hypothesized that men would score as more shame prone on scenarios in the MUI 
condition , women would score as more shame prone in the FUI condition and that there 
would not be a gender difference in shame proneness scores for the FUI condition . Yet 
these expected gender differences were not found, either in terms of statistically 
significant interactions between gender and gender relevant threat or in the effect sizes 
obtained for that interaction. The same was true of the expected gender differences in 
guilt proneness derived from scenarios representing the BD and DBD conditions. 
Scenarios were chosen to represent these conditions using participants' ratings of the 
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degree to which scenarios "caused trouble" for others (the operationalization for bringing 
disadvantage). Given that bringing disadvantage to others is theorized to be a greater 
societal taboo for women than men, at least in the U.S., it was expected that women's 
guilt proneness scores would be higher than men's for those scenarios in the BD 
condition. This expected gender difference was also not found. This raised the question 
of why the anticipated gender differences were not found. 
Why were the expected gender differences in guilt and shame proneness across 
the GR-TOSCA conditions not found? Several possible explanations to this question 
were be explored. The first possibility is that there were simply not enough "goo d" 
scenarios representing the MUI and FUI conditions in the GR-TOSCA as a result of 
selection procedures that were too liberal. That is, it may be the case that the magnitude 
of the difference in participants' perceptions of gender-specific unwanted identities was 
just not large enough to result in differences in guilt and shame proneness scores. As 
previously mentioned , creating convincing , interesting scenarios that represented each of 
the six conditions proved to be a real challenge. Although the 22 scenarios used in the 
present research had "survived " being pilot-tested twice , five of these still had to be 
discarded in the thesis. Liberal selection criteria ( effect size differences of .20 or greater) 
were used , in part, to ensure that each condition was represented by at least two 
scenarios. Ideally , a larger number of scenarios would have been used in the thesis to 
ensure that more scenarios, perhaps meeting a more stringent selection criterion, would 
be assigned to each condition. But presenting participants with more scenarios would 
create additional problems. Even with only 22 scenarios, the length of the GR-TOSCA 
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was substantial. Completing the 22-item GR-TOSCA along with the other instruments 
administered in this research took participants an estimated 2 hours. Asking volunteers to 
spend more time than this is unreasonable and unlikely to produce quality responses. If 
subsequent research can continue to construct and refine scenarios that better capitalize 
on gender-specific unwanted identities, perhaps a more stringent criterion could be used 
to assign scenarios to each condition (e.g., larger effect sizes). Then, the magnitude of 
the difference in participants' perceptions of gender-specific unwanted identities might 
correspondingly be large enough to provide more power for statistical testing thereby 
finding the expected gender differences in guilt and shame proneness scores. 
A second possible explanation for the lack of gender differences in guilt and 
shame on the GR-TOSCA concerns the way in which scenarios were selected to 
represent differential gender threats and gender relevant differences in disadvantaging 
others. Recall that scenarios were chosen to represent the MUI, FUI and NUI conditions 
based on participants' ratings of the extent to which they represented an unwanted 
identity for the "typical male" and the "typical female." Scenarios were not, however, 
chosen based on the extent to which any of the scenarios were specifically threatening to 
their own identity as a man or a woman. There may well be a disconnect between 
perceptions of what is stereotypically threatening to men or women as a group versus 
what is personally threatening to the self as a unique man or woman. If this is true, then 
this might explain the failure to find differences in shame proneness as a function of 
participant gender. In essence, the failure to tailor selection of the scenarios to 
participants' personal gender identity might have obscured the gender differences that 
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could have otherwise been detected. This observation helped to make sense of the 
discrepancy in the findings obtained in the present thesis when compared to those 
reported by Ferguson, Stegge , Eyre , Vollmer , and Ashbaker (2000). In the latter study, 
the expected Gender x Gender Relevant Threat interaction was obtained for participants ' 
shame proneness ratings. However, the selection of scenario to represent gender relevant 
threats was based on participants rating of the extent to which they personally came 
across as possessing undesirable characteristic in that situation. Scenarios were selected 
to represent FUis only when the women as a group had agreed that the scenario was 
threatening to their identity or as representative of MUis only when the men as a group 
were agreed that the scenarios were threatening to their identity . The same problem 
may also exist for the scenarios representing the bring disadvantage and does not bring 
disadvantage conditions, resulting in the lack of gender differ ences in guilt proneness 
scores across these conditions. Scenarios were chosen to represent these conditions 
based on participants ' ratings of the extent to which they thought the "typical male " or 
"typical female" would be causing trouble for others in that situation. It may be the case 
that the focus on "typical " individuals , as opposed to asking participants how they would 
feel personally , may have obscured any gender differences in guilt proneness. 
In retrospect , the null findings obtained in the thesis regarding gender differences 
in guilt and shame proneness might be a result of asking participants the wrong 
manipulation check questions. These problems may have resulted in the inability to 
demonstrate that gender differences in shame proneness were a function of the gender-
relevance of the threat or that gender differences in guilt proneness were a function of the 
extent disadvantage was perceived to be brought. But there might be an unintended 
benefit of these results. The GR-TOSCA as it is presently designed produces no 
significant gender differences in shame or guilt and might thus be considered a nicely 
gender-balanced instrument for use in future research. 
These explanations for the failure to find gender differences in guilt and shame 
proneness on the GR-TOSCA need to be weighed, however, in light of other 
nondifferences found. Importantly, it will be recalled that there also were no gender 
differences in either emotion for the TOSCA-2 in the present sample of participants. 
This was a disturbing finding that deserved at least an attempt at explanation. 
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As described in the Method chapter, participants completed all instruments via the 
Internet and then recorded their responses on pencil and paper. This needs to be 
recognized as a potential limitation to the present results , or at least the ability to compare 
these results with others' findings, because all previous studies in this area have relied on 
paper-and-pencil delivery methods as opposed to using the Internet. Although the 
Internet-based delivery method was used to reduce the costs of administration (e.g., 
photocopy expenses) , it was still important to ask whether this particular methodology 
somehow affected participants' responses. There were no clear-cut answers to this 
question. It should be noted, however, that a study was conducted by Batis (2002) with 
exactly the same group of general psychology students as the source of his sample. Batis 
administered the TOSCA-2 to these students using either paper-and-pencil or Internet 
delivery. He found the traditionally obtained gender difference in scores on the TOSCA-
2 in both delivery modes, that is, the females scored as both more guilt and shame prone 
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on this instrument regardless of whether they had completed the measure via the Internet 
or paper-and-pencil. Given the strong correlations obtained in this thesis between 
TOSCA-2 scores and GR-TOSCA scores, it seemed reasonable to argue that Batis also 
would have found similar effects for the GR-TOSCA. In all , then , the delivery mode as 
such did not seem to be a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy in results found in 
this thesis when compared to previous studies. 
The failure to replicate gender differences in guilt and shame scores in this sample 
was one of two inconsistencies found when compared to prior research. The second 
discrepancy concerned the extremely high correlations found between guilt and shame 
proneness scores in the present sample. The correlations between guilt and shame 
proneness in the present sample were .60 for the TOSCA-2, (df= 201,p <.001) and .83 
for the GR-TOSCA (df= 190, p < .001). These associations were very strong when 
compared to others' findings, who typically reported correlations on the order of .45 
between TOSCA-2 guilt versus shame proneness scores. These associations were even 
stronger when compared to Batis 's results in his Internet sample from the same class of 
students (r = .17). A reasonable question, therefore, was whether some aspect of the 
administration procedure used in the present thesis introduced some form of bias in the 
data . One possible explanation was that the procedures made it clear to the participants ' 
that gender differences were under investigation in the research and that this knowledge 
somehow influenced their responses. For example, participants may have (consciously or 
unconsciously) responded to the instruments in such a way that reduced any gender 
differences. The salient gender component of the research may also have acted as a 
71 
prime, causing participants ' to choose answers that maximized social desirability . Given 
that "feminine" items emphasizing, for example, nurturance and caring, were likel y to be 
perceived as more socially desirable , gender differences may have been minimized. 
Although no gender differences in guilt and shame proneness were found, there 
several statistically significant diff erences in guilt and shame proneness as a function of 
scenario type were found. First, participants' shame proneness ratings in the gender 
neutral condition were greater than those for either the FUI condition or the MUI 
condition. Recall that the scenarios in both the MUI and FUI conditions were 
constructed using Eisler and Skidmore ' s (1987) research on gender stress. The scales 
that Eis ler developed focused on relatively significant life events , such as losing one 's job 
and the inability to perform sexually . The creation of scenar ios in the NUI condition 
required the author to imagine situations that wou ld not be diff erentially gender 
threatening , such as spilling soup into someone's lap or making a social faux pas. It 
seemed possible that the smaller shame-proneness scores in this latter condition might be 
a result of the differential importance or significance of the situations presented. Those 
situations described in the gender relevant conditions may simply have been greater 
threats to the unwanted identities of the participants because of their relative importance 
or impact on one's life. 
The results also showed that participants scored as more shame prone for those 
situations that brought disadvantage versus those that did not bring disadvantage . 
Although it was hypothesized that the scenarios in the bring disadvantage condition 
would represent additional unwanted identities for women only, causing their shame 
scores to be higher than those of men, a statistically significant main effect for gender 
was not found. This finding suggested that the scenarios in the bring disadvantage 
scenarios represented additional unwanted identities for both women and men. 
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A main effect for guilt proneness scores was also found for the unwanted identity 
condition, such that participants' guilt proneness scores were highest for those scenarios 
representing FUis, second highest for scenarios representing NUis and lowest for 
scenarios representing MUis. This particular finding may have been a result of the biases 
introduced by the administration procedures mentioned above. If participants were 
responding to these scenarios with the intention of making socially desirable responses , 
they may have been inclined to report feeling especially guilty in the scenarios in the FUI 
condition. For example, participants may have over-reported feeling guilty in response to 
scenarios base on Eisler ' s "fear of not being nurturant " to appear compassionate and 
sensitive. 
And finally , participants guilt proneness scores also showed a main effect for the 
bring disadvantage condition , such that their guilt proneness scores were higher for those 
scenarios that brought disadvantage versus those that did not bring disadvantage. As 
described in the Literature Review chapter , it is believed that women are socialized in the 
U.S. to feel more guilt in response to disadvantaging others. Therefore it was 
hypothesized that women would score as more guilt prone than men in response to those 
scenarios that bring disadvantage versus those that do not. As with all of the 
hypothesized gender differences, this prediction was not borne out, suggesting that both 
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men and women felt more guilt in response to those situations that brought disadvantage 
to others. 
The final objective of the thesis was to ascertain whether the gender roles to 
which individuals subscribe played a major role in impacting guilt and shame proneness 
on the GR-TOSCA . It was argued women (relative to men) are socialized in the U.S. to 
be more sensitive to identity threats and to causing problems for others . The tendency to 
endorse these "feminine" gender role traits is operationalized in the BSRI with items that 
correspond to shame-relevant behaviors such as being "s hy" and "y ielding " and guilt-
relevant behavior such as being "eager to soothe hurt feelings." One who endorses 
masculine traits on the BSRJ is not professing to be very sensitive to shame- or guilt-
relevant concerns by indicating that he or she is "w illing to take a stand," "se lf-reliant " 
and "agg ressive." Given this , it was hypoth esize d that BSRI femininity scores would be 
positively correlated with both the guilt and shame proneness scores on the TOSCA-2 
and ihe GR-TOSCA , whereas the latter scores should be negatively correlated with BSRI 
masculinity scores . There was little support for this entire pattern of predictions. In fact , 
the most salient findings for both the TOSCA-2 and the GR-TOSCA were that (a) shame 
proneness scores tended to be negatively correlated with endorsements of both masculine 
and feminine traits , whereas (b) guilt proneness scores were positively associated with 
masculine and especially with feminine gender role endorsements. The most plausible 
interpretation of these findings is that the BSRI is not measuring the types of masculine 
or feminine traits that needed to be measured in order to adequately address the original 
predictions. In retrospect, a measure of gender role endorsement that better corresponded 
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with Eisler and Skidmore's (1987) Gender Role Stressors (used to create the GR-TOSCA 
scenarios) should have been used to test these predictions. Eisler and Skidmore ' s gender 
stressors tended to focus on inadequacies or undesirable aspect of gender identity ( e.g., 
fear of intellectual inferiority, fear of victimization), which do not align well with the 
gender identities measured by the BSRI. In hindsight, then, it seemed likely that the 
wrong choice of gender role endorsement (the BSRI) was likely made to test the original 
predictions. 
What , then , do the positive guilt-BSRI masculinity and femininity correlations 
mean? A good case can be made that the BSRI masculinity score was really measuring a 
person ' s tendency to subscribe to autonomous , agentic attributes -- instrumental traits that 
most people would like to possess , at least in U.S. society (Levit , 1991 ). A good case can 
also be made that many , though certainly not all , of the BSRI femininity items are 
assessing the person's tendency to act in a communal manner (represented in the BSRI by 
items such as " loyal ," "understanding ," "sympathetic ," "eager to soothe hurt feelings ") --
which also is a desirable response tendency (Levit , 1991 ). Thus , the BSRI items are 
really assessing, for the most part, a person ' s tendency to endorse desirable components 
to either the masculine or feminine role (Bakan, 1966). Similarly , a good case can be 
made that guilt proneness , at least as operationalized in the TOSCA-2 and GR-TOSCA , 
was a desirable way to behave. After all, guilt proneness was indexed in both of these 
measures by the person ' s tendency to endorse reparative behaviors, relationship-
restorative behaviors , and behaviors that put the person in control of the untoward 
situation. Thus, the fact that guilt proneness was positively correlated with the BSRI's 
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operationalization of positively valued masculine and feminine traits may simply have 
meant that tendencies to endorse desirable ways of responding or "being" were associated 
with one another. This interpretation additionally made sense of the negative part 
correlations between shame-proneness and the BSRI masculinity and femininity scores. 
Shame proneness was operationalized in the TOSCA-2 and the GR-TOSCA by the 
person's tendency to endorse thoughts or behaviors that denigrated the self or avoided 
restorative , reparative action -- which certainly was not the most desirable way of 
reacting to these situations. Thus, the fact that shame proneness was negatively correlated 
with the BSRI's operationalization of positively valued masculine and feminine traits 
may simply have meant that tendencies to endorse desirable versus undesirable ways of 
responding or "being " were oppositely associated . 
This research had several additional limitations due to the nature of the sampling 
and data collection procedures . First , the composition of the sample used limits the 
generaiizability of any findings to a very specific population of undergraduate 
psychology students in a particular location. Ultimately , the goal in studying these 
emotions was to understand how they functioned in a much larger population , but 
generalizations from this research must be limited to the narrow population from which 
this sample was drawn. Secondly , there were limitations imposed upon the validity of the 
measures of the constructs examined due to the use of self-report in data collection. 
Although self-report measures can potentially be biased , the instruments outlined in this 
thesis were of the best measures of these emotions that were available. Finally , because 
the primary goal of the proposed research was to explore the weaknesses of existing 
literature in the area , and to expand upon it, it was necessary to rely on similar samples, 
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Date created: October 25th, 2000 
Informed Consent 
Identifying the Bases for Gender Differences in Guilt and Shame 
Introduction/Purpose 
This study is being conducted as part of Shawn Edmondson's thesis. The project 
is being supervised by Professor Tamara J. Ferguson in the Department of Psychology at 
Utah State University. This study is meant to find out more about people's reactions in 
certain situations. You have been asked to take part because we will be using college 
students as participants. In all , we hope to have about 200 college students participate. 
Procedures 
You will be given four questionnaires to comp lete. They assess your reactions in 
different types of situations and/or your fee lings in general. Completing all four 
questionnaires should take you less than one hour. 
New Findings 
Should there be any changes in the risks or benefits involved in the study during 
your participation , we will contact you immediately . We will do this so that you may 
consider whether you wish to continue your participation. If new information is obtained 
that is relevant or useful to you, or if the procedures and/or methods change at any time 
throughout this study , your consent to continue participating in this study will be obtained 
again. 
Based on previous experience , we do not expect there to be any risks. 
Benefits 
Although it may not directly benefit you, your participation in this research may 
help benefit psychology's understanding people's feelings and general reactions. The 
study is of benefit to you in that your course professor may offer you extra credit toward 
the course for your participation. 
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Informed Consent 
Identifying the Bases for Gender Differences in Guilt and Shame 
Explanation & offer to answer questions 
Shawn Edmondson has explained this study to you and answered your questions . 
If you have other questions or research-related problems, you may reach Professor 
Ferguson at 797-3272. 
Voluntary nature of participation 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you may refuse to participate or 
withdraw at any time without consequence or loss of benefits . 
Confidentiality 
We guarantee that your participation is confidential. You will never be identified 
by name. Only the investigative team will have access to any data and all data are kept in 
locked filing cabinets . The data will be kept until such time that it is thoroughly 
processed and pubiished. Please also note that an individual 's data are never reported . 
Results are always processed across a group of people. We abide by these rules of 
confidentiality because it is our ethical responsibility to you to do so. Records also are 
kept confidential consistent with federal and state regulations 
IRB Approval Statement 
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) for the protection of human subjects at 
Utah State University has reviewed and approved this research project. 
Copy of Consent 
You have been given two copies of the Informed Consent. Please sign both 
copies. Return one signed copy to Shawn Edmondson. Retain the other copy for your 
files. 
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Investigator Statement 
You certify that the research study has been explained to me by Shawn 
Edmondson. I understand the nature and purpose , the possible risks and benefits 
associated with taking part in the research study. Any questions that have been raised, 
have been answered. 
Signature of PI & Student Researcher 
Dr. Tamara Ferguson 
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797-3 272 
Signature of Subject 
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The following is one of the three male versions ( containing the original 22 scenarios) of 
the GR-TOSCA delivered via HTML on the WWW . Following the GR-TOSCA 
questions is a one-page example of the "bubble " answer form onto which participants 
recorded their answers. 
Below you will be asked to 'read different situations and imagine they have happened 
to you. Some of these situations may seem irrelevant because it's unlikely you would 
find yourself ii'} that situation. For example, a situation may refer to your spouse and 
you may not be married. That's okay - it<loesn't matter if the situation doesn't 
accurately reflect your current circumstances. Just Imagine that the situation is 
applicable to you. You MUST work alone-don't let anyone influence your answers! 
For each of the situat ions you will be asked questions like these : 
- In this situation, to what extent does a typical male come across as possessing 
undesirable characteristics? 
- In this situation, to what extent does a typical female come across as possessing 
undesirable characteristics? 
- Let's say that this situation really happened to a typical male. To what extent did this 
typical male cause trouble for others involved in the situation? 
-Let's say that this situation really happened to a typical female. To what extent did 
this typical female cause trouble for others involved in the situation? 
These questions ask you about the "typical male" or "typical female." With the word 
"typical," we mean most of the males or females you know around your age. You 
should be thinking of the many males you know or the many females you know. All 
the questions will be referring to the person indicated by the (X). 
These questions also ask about "causing trouble" for others. Think of the word 
"trouble" as meaning: hurt them, hurt their feelings, Interfered with their welfare In 
some way, or caused them problems. 
Please mark all of your answers on the bubble form entitled GR-TOSCA Completely fill the 
bubbles !!Vith eitper a pencil or pen. PLEASE, take the task seriously and do not mark : 
"bogus" answers . Let's begin. 








quite a bit 
7 
•xtremely 
1b) Let's say that this situation mally happened to you - that is, you are (X). Towhat 
extent do you feel you "caused *'ouble" for others involved in the situation? 
7 
ectremely 
1c) In this situation, to what exta1t would (X), if he were a typical male, come cross 






quite a bit 
7 
edremely 
1d) In this situation, to what exta1t does (X) if she were a typical female, come across 
as possessing undesirable charccteristics? 
1 2 




quite a bit 
7 
e;tremely 
1e) Let's say that this situation rtally happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what 
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others involved in the situation 
1 










quite a bit 
7 
e>tremely 
1f) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To what 




quite a bit 
1g)How much wou ld you study harder so you'll play better in the future? 
2 
not at all very slightly 
~ ~ ,_, 
6 










quite a bit 
94 
1 i) How much would you think you're not smart? 
1 4 




quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
1j) How much would you feel like you'd let your team down and that they had lost 
because of you? 
1 
not at all 
6 
quite a bit 












2b) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that Is, you are (X). To what 
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation? 
1 










quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
2c) How much would you think that you need to change the way you act so people 
don't think you're homosexual? 
1 

















2e) In this situ~tlon, to what extent .would (X), if .he we~e a typical male, come across 






2f) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across 







2g) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what 




quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
2h) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To 








2i) How much would you feel like you're a failure as a man? 
6 





not at all 
5 
moderately 
2j) How much would you feel guilty for making her feel uncomfortable? 
1 















3a) In this situation, to what extent would (X), If he were a typical male, come across 
as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
6" 
quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
3b) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across 
as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
6 




3c) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what 
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others Involved In the situation? 
1 





3d) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who Is a typical female. To 
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others Involved In the 
situation? 
1 2 




quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
3e) How much would you feel the need to plan a new exercise regime to get back Into 
shape? 
1 2 





3f) How much would you feel like you wish you could just hide? 
1 








quite a bit 
6 
quite a bit 
3g) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing 
undesirable characteristics? 
1 2 











3h) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that Is, you are (X). To what 















3j}How much would you worry that your significant other's feelings will be hurt , 
because you can't use the gift? · 
4 5 7 
97 
not at all very slightly slightly a little moderately quite a bit extremely 
4a) In this situation, to what extent would (X), If he were a typical male, come across 
as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
'i( 
2 
not at all very slightly 
6 
quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
4b) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across 
as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
1 




quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
4c) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what 
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others involved in the situation? 
1 










quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
4d) Let's say that this situation reall)'. happened to {X), who is a typical female. To 









quite a bit 
4e) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing 
undesirable characteristics? 
1 













4f) Let's say that this situation really happened to you -that is, you are (X). To what 












4g) How much would you feel the need to let your family know how guilty you feel 
about the situation? 
1 
not at all 
1 
not at all 
4i) How much would you feel "worthless "? 
1 








quite a bit 
4j) How much would you think, "It's all my fault that my family is struggling 
financially"? 
1 2 




quite a bit 






















quite a bit 
Sc) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing 
undesirable characteristics? 










Sd) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what 
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation? 
1 4 




quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
Se) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across 





Sf) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across 









Sg) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what 










quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
Sh) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To 
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved in the 
situation? 
1 





Si) How much would you feel fat and ugly? 
1 2 










quite a bit 
6 





Sj) How much would you worry that your significant other is embarrassed about your 
weight gain? 
1 2 

















quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
6b) How much would you want to avoid eye contact and just get away from the 
situation? 
1 4 





6c) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across 










quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
6d) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across 
as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
1 2 







6e) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what 
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others involved in the situation? 
1 










quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
6f) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To what 
extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved in the situation? 
2 4 




quite a bit 






6h) Let's say that this situation really happened to you· that is, you are (X). To "'1hat 
101 
1 2 




quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
6i) How much would you feel like you're stupid for not seeing this problem coming? 
1 
not at all 
6j) How much would you think,"This is my fault"? -
1 











quite a bit 
6 

















quite a bit 
7c) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing 
undesirable characteristics? 
1 













7d) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what 
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others Involved in the situation? 
6 
quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
7e) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across 
as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
1 2 
not at all very slightly 
6 




7f) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across 







7g) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what 






quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
7h) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X}, who Is a typical female .. To 
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others Involved in the 
situation? 
1 





71} How much would you want to apologize to your spouse? 
1 2 








quite a bit 
6 





7j} How much would you want to avoid talking to your spouse about the problem? 
1 2 










quite a bit 
6 





.Sb} Let's say that this situat ion really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what 
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation? 
103 
1 2 









quite a bit 
6 

















quite a bit 
6 
quite a bit 
6 







Sg) In this situation, to what extent would (X), If he were a typical male, come a¢ross 
as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
1 2 






quite a bit 
7 
eitremely 
Sh) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across 
as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
1 2 






quite a bit 
7 
exremely 
Si) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what 
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others Involved in the situation , 
2 4 




quite a bit 
7 
exremely 
Sj) Let's say thafthis situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To what 
extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others Involved in the situatio1? 
1 4 









not at all 
1 








quite a bit 
6 
quite a bit 
6 







9d) How much would you keep your feelings to yourself, not really talking about how 
you feel? 
1 4 




quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
9e) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across 
as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
1 










quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
9f) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across 






quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
9g) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what 






9h) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who Is a typical female. To 
















9j) Let's say that this situation really happened to you. that Is, you are (X). To what 
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved In the situation? 
1 2 
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10a) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across 
as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
1 










quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
10b) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come 
across as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
1 2 






quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
10c) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male: To what 




quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
10d) Let's say th~t this situation really happened to (X), whoJs a typical female. To 






quite a bit 
7 
extremely 




10f) How much would you be unable to make eye contact with your teammates and 
would want to just leave the game? 
7 
extremely 
1 Og) How much would you worry that your teammates think you're a terrible athlete? 
1 2 






quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
1 Oh) How much would you worry about making your teammates feel bad because of 
your lousy performance? 
1 2 






quite a bit 













10j) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what 
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation? 
2 4 









quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
11 b) How much would you worry about the difficulties you have caused for your 
spouse? 
1 
not at all 
6 
quite a bit 
11c) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing 
undesirable characteristics? 









11 d) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what 




quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
11e) How much would you want to apologize to your family for not being able to finish 
the errands? 
1 










quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
11f) After you get home from the hospital, how much would you want to just be by 
yourself and not talk to people? 
1 










quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
11g) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across 







not at all very slightly a little moderately quite a bit extremely 
111) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X}, who Is a typical male. To what 
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others Involved In the situation? 
11j) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X}, who is a typical female. To 





quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
12a) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across 
as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
1 










quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
12b) In this situat ion, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come 
across as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
2 4 




quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
12c) Let'f say that this situation really happened to (X), who Is a typical male. To what 
extent did this typical male "cause trouble " for others Involved In the situation? 
1 2 4 





quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
12d) Let's say that this situat ion really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To 












quite a bit 
7 
extremely 




12g) How much would you want to apologize over and over to your friend and 
promise to make it up? 
1 
not at all 
12h) How much would you tend to avoid eye contact the next time you see your 
friend? 
1 





12i) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing 
undesirable characteristics? 
2 













12j) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what 
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation? 
1 










quite a bit 
1~a) In t,l;lis situatt9n, to wl1at extent do you (X) come across as possessing 
undesirable characteristics? 
6 






13b) Let's say that this situation really happened to you -that Is, you are (X). To what 
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved In the situation? 
1 





13c) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across 
as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
~--===-.:- ..... __ ...::....:~;.;;;...........:::....:::;.-:::::;;;..... __ ....=-' 
1 





13d) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come 




quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
13e) Let'e say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what 










quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
13f) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who Is a typical female. To 
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved in the 
situation? 
1 







13g) How much would you think, "I'm a clumsy fool." 
6 
quite a bit 
6 
quite a bit 
13h) How much would you feel terrible for the if!,COnvenience you've caused? 
1 4 
not at all a little 
6 







not at all very slightly slightly a little moderately 
13j) How much would you want to "escape" the restaurant? 
1 
not at all 
1 
not at all 
14b) How much would you feel like a failure? 
. 
1 2 3 4 







quite a bit 
6 
quite a bit 
6 
quite a bit 
6 








14c) How much would you want to tell your family how guilty you feel about the 
situation? 
2 








quite a bit 
7 
extremely 







quite a bit 
14e) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing 
undesirable characteristics? 
4 5 
a little moderately 
7 
extremely 
14f) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what 








14g) In this situation, to what extent would (X), If he were a typical male, come across 





14h) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come 








141) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what 








quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
14j) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To 
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others Involved in the 
situation? 
1 
















quite a bit 
6 







15c) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across 
as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
2 4 
113 
not at all very slightly slightly a little moderately quite a bit extremely 
15d) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come 
across as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
7 
extremely 
15e) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who Is a typical male. To what 
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others Involved In the situation? 
1 4 





15f) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To 
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved in the 
situation? 
4 5 6 7 
a little moderately quite a bit extremely 
15g) How much would you think you are a failure? 
1 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all slightly a little moderately quite a bit extremely 
15h) How much would you feel guilty for the inconvenience you've caused others? 
1 2 






quite a bit 




15j) Let's ' say that this situation really happened .to you - that is, you are {X). To what 




16a) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across 
as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
16b) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come 
across as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
1 2 





16c) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what 










quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
16d) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female . To 










quite a bit 
6 












quite a bit 







16h) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what 







quite a bit 
6 





16j) How much would you be unable to make eye contact with the instructor and 
would feel the need to get out of class? 
1 













quite a bit 
6 





17b) How much would you be sorry that you had caused yourself this embarrassment 
because you act too feminine? 
1 2 






quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
17c) In this situation, to what extent would (X), If he were a typical male, come across 






quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
17d) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come 
across as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
116 
17e) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what 






quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
17f) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To 
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved In the 
situation? 
1 4 




quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
17g) How much would you think that you should start acting more masculine? 
1 
not at all 
5 
moderately 
















17j) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what 
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation? 
1 2 
not at all very slightly 





11 ii,~ ,i, ,, ~ 1. 1ih '"(""'*' : r;u qi1•F, 
5 
moderately 
18a) f-:1ow much would you feel unlovable and undesirable? 
---
1 
not at all 
6 






18c) In this situation, to what exte.ntwould (X), if he were a typical male, come across 
as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
1 
not at all 
6 
quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
18d) 1n this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come 
across as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
7 
extremely 
18e) tet's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what 






quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
18f) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To 
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved in the 
situation? 
1 2 






quite a bit 
















18h) Let's say that this situation really happened to you -that is, you are (X). To what 
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others Involved in the situation? 
1 




quite a bit 










18j) How much would you want to just avoid everyone and stay home? 
1 










quite a bit 










19b) Let's say that this situation really happened to you -that is, you are (X). To what 
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation? 
1 4 





19c) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across 
as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
1 4 




quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
19d) In this situation, to what exte~t does (X) if she were a typical female, come 
across as possessing undesirable characteristics? 
1 2 






quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
19e) Let's say that this situation .really happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what , 
extent did this typical male "cause trouble" for others involved in the situation? 
1 4 
not at all a little 
19f) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To 










quite a bit 
19g) How much would you want to apologize and make things right? 
19h) How much would you not want to avoid going back to work? 
191) How much would you think you're a mean and selfish person? 
4 5 
a little moderately 
7 
extremely 
19j) How much would you feel sorry for the problems your behavior has caused your 
employer? 
2 




quite a bit 








20b) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what 








quite a bit 
7 
extremely 








quite a bit 





20e) In ths situation, to what extent would (X), If he were a typical male, come across 




quite a blt 
7 
extremely 
20f) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come across 






quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
20g) Let'ssay that this situation really happened to (X), who Is a typical male. To what 






quite a bit 
1 
extremely 
20b) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To 
what extent did this typical female "cause trouble" for others involved In the 
situation? 
1 








quite a bit 
6 
quite a bit 
6 








21a) In this situation, to what exent would (X), If he were a typical male, come across 
as possessing undesirable charccteristics? 
1 




quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
21b) In this situation, to what exbnt does (X) if she were a typical female, come 






quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
21c) Let's say that this situation ieally happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what 
extent did this typical male "caute trouble" for others involved In the situation? 
1 








quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
21d) Let's say that this situation ieally happened to (X), who is a typical female. To 
what extent did this typical femal~ "cause trouble" for others involved in the 
situation? 
1 










quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
21e) How much would you apolo9ize over and over to your parents and try to sell the 
stereo to get some of the money back? 
1 










quite a bit 







quite a bit 













21h) Let's say that this situation really happened to you - that is, you are (X). To what 
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation? 
1 
not at all 
21 i) How much would you feel like a bad son? 
1 
not at all 
1 2 








quite a bit 
6 
quite a bit 
6 







22a) In this situation, to what extent would (X), if he were a typical male, come across 








quite a bit 
7 
extremely 
22b) In this situation, to what extent does (X) if she were a typical female, come 





22c) Let's say that this situation reJlly happened to (X), who is a typical male. To what 
extent did this typical male "cause 'trouble" for others involved in the situation? 
22d) Let's say that this situation really happened to (X), who is a typical female. To 






quite a bit 
22e) In this situation, to what extent do you (X) come across as possessing 
undesirable characteristics? 
1 





22f) Let's say that this situation really happened to you -that is, you are (X). To what 
extent do you feel you "caused trouble" for others involved in the situation? 
1 





22g) How much would you call your friend and promise to stay up all night and help 













quite a bit 
6 





22i) How much would you worry that your friend will think you're incompetent? 
1 
not at all 
1 
















NOTE: Pay close attention to the question number s. The y go from left to right . 
Please write the last six digits of your student ID here: _ _ __ __ 
Please write your VERSION of GR-TOSCA: VER SION NUMBER 
Are you male or femal e? @ 0 
I a) 00 0 0 0 0 0 I b) 000 0 0 0 0 
I c) CD 0 0 0 00 0 Id ) CD 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I e) CD 0 0 0 00 0 It) CD 0 0 0 0 0 0 
l g) 00 0 0 00 0 I h) 00 0 0 0 0 0 
I i) 00 0 0 0 0 0 I j) 00 0 0 0 0 0 
2a) 00 0 0 0 0 0 2b) CD 0 00 0 0 0 
2c) 00 0 0 00 0 2d) CD 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2e) 00 0 0 0 0 0 2t) CD 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2g) 00 0 0 0 0 0 2h) CD 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2i) 00 0 0 0 0 0 2j) 00 0 0 0 0 0 
3a) CD 0 0 0 0 0 0 3b) 0000000 
3c) CD 0 0 0 00 0 3d) 000 0 0 0 0 
3e) CD 0 0 0 0 0 0 3t) 00 0 0 0 0 0 
3g) CD 0 0 0 0 0 0 3h) 00 0 0 0 0 0 
3i) 00 0 0 00 0 3j) 0000 0 0 0 
4a) 00 00 0 0 0 4b) 0000000 
4c) 00 0 0 0 0 0 4d) CD 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4e) CD 0 0 0 0 0 0 4t) CD 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4g) CD 0 0 0 0 0 0 4h) 00 0 0 0 0 0 





Below ~ou will find listed a number of personality characteristics. We would like you 
to use those characteristics to describe yourself, that Is; we would like you to 
Indicate, on a scale from 1 to 7, how true of you each characteristic Is. Please do not 
leave any characteristic unmarked. 
EXAMPLE : sly 
Fill in the bubble above 1 If it is never or almost never true that you are sly. 
Fill in the bubble above 2 If it is usually not true that you are sly. 
Fill In the bubble above 3 if it sometimes but infrequently true that you are sly 
Fill in the bubble above 4 if it is occassionally true that you are sly. 
Fill in the bubble above 5 if it is often true that you are sly 
Fill in the bubble above 6 if it is usually true that you are sly. 
Fill in the bubble above 7 If it is always or most always true that you are sly. 
Thus, if you feel it is sometimes but infrequently true that you are "sly", never or almost 
never true.that you are "malicious", always or almost always true that you are 
"irresponsible", and often true that you are "carefree", then you would rate these 
characteristics as follows: 
Sly-3 
Malicious - 1 
Irresponsible - 7 
Carefree-5 
You will respond by filling in the bubbles on the answer sheet labeled BSRI. Please 
do not skip any items -- rate all responses. 
127 
128 








8. Sensitive to needs of others 
9. Reliable 





15. Truthful , 
16. Have leadership abilities 
17. Eager to soothe hurt feelings 
129 
18. Secretive 






25. Willing to take a stand 
26. Love children 
27. Tactful 
28. Aggressive 
29 . Gentle 
30. Conventional 
130 
Appendix 0 : 
The TOSCA-2 
DIRECTlONS: 
Below are several situations that people are likely to encounter in day-to-day life, 
followed by several common reactions to those situations. As you read each 
scenario, try to imagine yourself in that situation. Then indicate how likely you would 
be to react in each of the ways described . We ask you to rate all responses because 
people may feel or react more than one way to the same situation, or they may react 
different ways at different times. 
For example: 
l t ' ,', q§ ~--;., ,v 11\d- ,.;11:n~,r t> 
,,~ ~)i. 1·.: .d.,,; 1~·:~ .:1r:ti 
~ " f I t " ~ r 
(a) You would telephone a friend to 
catch up on the news 1 2 3 4 5 
(b) You would take the extra time to 
read the paper 1 2 3 4 5 
(c) You would feel disappointed that 
it's raining 1 2 3 4 5 
(d) You would wonder why you woke I up so early 1 2 3 4 5 
In the above example, I've rated ALL of the answer. I chose a "1" for answer (a) 
because I wouldn't want to wake up a friend very early on a Saturday morning - so 
it's not at all likely that I would do .that. 
I chose a "5" for answer (b) because I almost always read the paper if I have time in 
the morning (very likely). I chose a "3" for answer (c) because for me it's about half 
and half •. Sometimes I would be disappointed about the rain and sometimes I wouldn't 
- It would depend on what I had planned. And I chose a "4" for answer (d)because I 
would probably wonder why I had awakened so early. 
You will respond by filling In the bubbles on the answer sheet labeled TOSCA-2. 




1 3 4 
You would think "I'm 1 2 3 4 5 Inconsiderate." 
You would think "Well, they'll 1 2 3 4 5 understand." 
1 3 4 5 
You would think: "My boss 1 3 4 distracted me". 
i ' l , • l l f tf It t ~ t { 't;'i; ' 0 • 1/'Q, ' 
> '} ' 
You would think: "This is making 
me anxious. I need to either fix it or 1 5 
get someone else to." 
1 5 
For days you'd worry about it, 
repeatedly trying to think of a way 1 5 
to remedy the situation. 
You think: "A lot of things aren't 1 5 
made very well these days." 
(e) You would think: "It was only an 1 2 3 4 5 
accident." 
.You would think: "I should have 
bQen·aware of what my best friend 
is feeling." 
You would feel happy with your 
appearance and personality. 
You would feel pleased to have 
made such a good impression. 
•c y OU can't stop thinking about the 
problems you may have caused 
your friend and their spouse. 
You would probably avoid eye-
contact for a long time. 
• , , 'f'i i1~1f1rq.1· r('\ 
• : ' '1 ~ ' ' • "<";:'. ! ( . • :! ' 1 ~·1; ; 
' '- • ' "' l } ! ~. 
(a) You'd bend over backwards for 
months to make up for it but fear 
that it won't make any difference. 
You would feel: "I deserve to be 
reprimanded for mismanaging the 
project." 
(e) You would think: "What's done is 
done." 
'~ > ~ nl. Ht'( 0 j// 1fi1;:,,,it~: 
" " '' ,,j \ i ~ 1 ( t ti 1 't; ( I 1 
You would think the company did 















2 i 3 4 5 
·i 
2 3 l 4 5 
I 




2 3 4 5 
II 
- If l 
5 l 2 3 4 
2 3 4 
2 3 4 5 







you would think: ,;Life is not fair." 
You would keep quiet and avoid the 
coworker. 
You would feel troubled and 
preoccupied with what happened 
but unable to correct the situation. 
You would feel unhappy and eager 
to correct the situation. 
You would think: "I guess I'm more 
persuasive than I thought". 
You would regret that you put it off. 
You would feel like a coward. 
You would think: "I did a good job." 
You would feel badly about getting 
off so easily and always feel 
"funny" whenever you thought 
about the call. 
You would think you shouldn't have 
to make calls you feel pressured 
into. 
You would feel Inadequate that you 
can't even throw a ball. 
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1 5 
1 4 5 
1 4 5 
1 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
(b) You would think maybe your friend 
needs more practice at catching. · 
You would think: "It was just an 
accident." 
(e) You would apologize and make sure 
your friend feels better. 
(c) 
(d) 
You would think:"I sure ran into 
some bad luck." 
You would return the favor as 
quickly as you could. 
You would think: "I am a 
trustworthy person." 
You'd still never be able to forgive 
yourself for putting your family out. 
You would think the animal · 
shouldn't have been on the road. 
135 
1 2 
1 3 f 
4 5 
II l! II 
1 2 3 4 5 
i 11 I 
1 2 1 3 I 4 5 
·. 




1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1111111111 
• 1 2 3 I 4 5 
Youwould feel: "Well, it was'an 
accident." 
(d) You'd have trouble getting the 
image of the animal out of your 
mind. 
YQu'd feel bad you hadn't been 
more alert driving down the road. 
You wou ld th ink: "Well, it's just a 
test.'' 
You would think: "The Instructor 
doesn't like me." 
You would think: " I should have 
studied harder." 
You keep thinking back to all of the 
things you did wrong in preparing 
for the exam. 
You would feel the boss is rather 
shortsighted. 
You would feel alone and apart 
from your colleagues. 
136 









Yqu would feel your hard work paid 
off · 
You would feel competent and 
proud of yourself. 
You would feel you should not 
accept it. 
y~u'd feel compelled to find new 
·wais each day to make it up to your 
coworkers. 
You would think that perhaps that 
friend should have been there to 
defend himself/herself. 
You would berate yourself over and 
over for it and vow never to do it 
again. 
You would apologize and talk about 
that person's good points 
You would think your boss should 
have been more clear about what 





1 ' I 
• 









,12 I 3 I 4 5 
~ 
-
2 3 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
I 




2 4 5 
2 4 5 
2 4 5 
(b) You would walk around for days 
kicking yourself, thinking of all the 
mistakes you made. 
You would feel like you wanted to 
hide. 
You would think: "I should have 
recognized the problem and done a 
better job." 
(e) You would think: "Welf, nobody's 
perfect" 
You would feel selfish and you'd 
think you are basically lazy. 
Every time you hear about the kids, 
you get a gnawing feeling inside, 
knowing how you almost let them 
down. 
You would feel you were forced into 
doing something you did not want 
todo. 














Ii 3 " 4 s 1;!17 
I I 
3 4 5 
I 
3 4 5 
' II "" 
II 3 4 5 
3 4 5 
II 
You would think: "I am 
irresponsible and incompetent." 
(b) You would think that your friend 
must not take very good care of 
their dog or it wouldn't have run 
away. 
You would feel badly every time 
you saw a dog. 
You would vow to be more careful 
next time. 
) You would think your friend could 
just get'a new dog. 
You think your coworker should 
have expected some accidents at 
such a big party. 
(b) You would stay late to help clean 
up the stain after the party. 
(c) Every time you see your co-worker 
you get a nervous feeling in the pit 
of your stomach, thinking of that 
stain on the carpet 
You would wish you were anywhere 
but at the party. 
You would wonder why your 
c9worker chose to serve red wine 
with the new light carpet. 
139 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 3 4 5 
